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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1970, section 112 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) has 
required the EPA to establish national emission standards for haz-
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ardous air pollutants (NESHAPs),l or air toxics.2 Section 112 reg-
ulates all stationary sources such as factories, power plants, and 
refineries that emit listed air toxics? The Act currently lists 187 
different types of regulated hazardous air pollutants, some of 
which are carcinogens and some of which are non-carcinogens that 
pose other serious health risks.4 
In section 112 of the 1970 Amendments to the Act,S Congress 
mandated that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) establish health-based6 standards for air toxics that 
1 The 1970 Act defined a hazardous air pollutant as "an air pollutant to which no ambi-
ent air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator [of 
the EPA] causes, or contributes to ... an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(I) (1970). 
2 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECfION AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPAl4511K-98-001, TAKING TOXICS 
OUT OF AIR 1,2 (1998) [hereinafter TAKING TOXICS OUT] (discussing health impacts of 
HAPs), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/takingtoxics; Patricia Ross McCubbin, 
Amending the Clean Air Act to Establish Democratic Legitimacy for the Residual Risk Pro-
gram, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (noting that Mary Jean Sawey, David R. HoJtgrave, 
and John D. Graham in their article, The Potential Health Benefits of Controlling Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 473, 477 (1990), refer interchangeably to "hazard-
ous air pollutants" and "air toxies"). Some courts or commentators use the abbreviation 
"HAPs" for hazardous air pollutants. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004). 
3 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(3) (2000) (defining "stationary source" of hazardous air pollutants 
as having same definition as that found in Section l11(a): "any building, structure, facility, 
or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant"). The hazardous emissions of 
mobile sources, such as cars, trucks, and buses, are beyond the scope of this article. See 42 
U.S.c. § 7521(1) (addressing mobile source-related air toxics). 
4 In the 1990 Amendments, Congress initially listed 189 hazardous air pollutants, but the 
EPA, acting under the authority of section 112(b)(3)(C), later deleted caprolactam and 
most recently delisted ethylene glycol monobutyl ether. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(b)(I), 
7412(b)(3)(c) (1994) (listing 189 hazardous air pollutants and giving the EPA authority to 
delete air toxics if it concludes that substance poses no adverse effects to human health or 
environment); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 1 n.l (stating that the EPA delisted caprolactam 
and that 188 chemicals were listed in 2003); Petition To Delist of Ethylene Glycol 
Monobutyl Ether, 69 Fed. Reg. 96,320 (Nov. 29, 2004) (delisting ethylene glycol monobutyl 
ether (EGBE) from section 112(b)(I) list of air toxics, but continuing regulation of EGBE 
as volatile organic compound). 
5 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 7412). 
6 See Alan Jay Goldberg, Note, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants 
Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613 n.ll (1988) (stating, 
"The term 'health-based' ... is used to refer to those factors relating exclusively to the risk 
posed to human health by ingestion of a given pollutant."). Some courts or commentators 
would characterize section 112 as a "risk-based" statute regulating air emissions based on 
their likely impacts on human health. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979 ("EPA fol-
lowed a risk-based analysis to set emission standards under the statute, meaning that the 
EPA considered levels of HAPs at which health effects are observed, factored in an 'ample 
margin of safety to protect the public health,' and set emission restrictions accordingly.") 
(emphasis in original). 
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provide "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health 
from such hazardous air pollutant. "7 However, the statute failed to 
provide adequate guidance on how the EPA should interpret or 
apply the "ample margin" standard.8 Because the EPA regulated 
only seven air toxics from 1970 until 1990,9 Congress in the 1990 
Amendments to the ActIO substantially revised section 112 to 
authorize the EPA to use a primarily technology-basedll regulatory 
scheme to reduce air toxics. 12 The 1990 Amendments require the 
EPA to issue emissions standards based on the "maximum achieva-
ble control technology" (MACT) standard for each category or 
subcategory of major13 sources of air toxics.14 Subsection 
112(c)(9)(B), however, authorizes the EPA under certain condi-
tions to delete, or "delist," a category or subcategory of sources 
from MACT standards if all sources in the category or subcategory 
are "low-risk. "15 
7 § 112, 84 Stat. at 1685; Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an 
"Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 267-68 (1994); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 3-4, 6-7; Arnold W. 
Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell, Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REv. 229, 237 (2001). 
8 See 3 GERRARD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 17.06[1][a][i] (2005). 
9 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Report of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, H.R. REp. No. 101-490, at 150 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Report] 
(explaining failure of section 112 as caused by several factors, including "fault with the 
basie legislation, fault with its administration, fault with the public understanding, and fault 
[with] the way the legislation has been working to protect the public health"); Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1989: Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, S. 
REP. No. 101-228, at 3 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3385 [hereinafter 1989 
Senate Report] ("Very little has been done since the passage of the 1970 [Act] to identify 
and control hazardous air pollutants."); Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979. 
10 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in 
various parts of 42 V.S.c. §§ 7401-7671(q)). 
11 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(f)(1)(B). 
12 See 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 144 (stating purpose of 1990 Amendments to 
Section 112 is to "strengthen and expand the Clean Air Act" through a "technology-
based ... program"); 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 133 (stating there is a "broad 
consensus that the program to regulate [air toxies] under section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
should be restructured to provide EPA with authority to regulate ... with technology-based 
standards") (emphasis added); Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979; Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya 
D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,235, 10,246 (1992). 
13 The Act defines a "major source" of air toxics as a source releasing at least 10 tons 
per year (tpy) of any single hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons of any combination of such 
pollutants. 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(1). 
14 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(2)-(3) (defining and requiring the EPA to promulgate "maxi-
mum available control technology" (MACT) for all major sources of air toxics); Sierra 
Club, 353 F.3d at 980. 
15 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i)-(ii). 
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This article will focus on the scope of the EPA's authority to 
delist categories and subcategories of sources, especially those 
emitting carcinogens. The plain language of subsection 
112( c )(9)(B) provides different requirements for carcinogenic and 
non-carcinogenic air toxics. Under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii), the 
EPA has authority to exempt either categories or subcategories of 
sources emitting non-carcinogenic air toxics from MACT standards 
as long as the EPA substitutes standards that are "adequate to pro-
tect public health within an ample margin of safety" and that will 
cause "no adverse environmental effect. "16 By contrast, subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly provides the EPA with the authority to 
exempt from MACT standards only whole categories of carcino-
genic sources, provided that no source in the category emits air 
toxics causing "a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one-in-one-
million to the individual in the popUlation who is most exposed to 
emissions of such pollutants from the source."17 The subsection 
does not explicitly authorize the EPA to exempt a subcategory of 
sources releasing carcinogenic chemicals. The omission of the term 
"subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is potentially very sig-
nificant and may limit the EPA's authority to delist a subcategory 
of carcinogenic sources from a larger category of such sources. 
Even though subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s statutory language 
only authorizes the EPA to exempt whole categories of carcino-
genic sources, the EPA recently published a rule that purports to 
use that very subsection to delist a subcategory of "low-risk" 
sources. On July 30, 2004, the EPA published a final rule for the 
plywood and composite wood industries (PCWP). The rule estab-
lished MACT standards for approximately 223 sources that release 
potentially carcinogenic air toxics, including formaldehyde.1s 
16 See 42 v.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii). 
17 See 42 v.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). 
18 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite 
Wood Products; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Timber Products 
Point Source Category; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, 
Source Category List, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,944, 45,996-45,997 (July 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
PCWP Rule] (stating that one "commenter's sensitivity analysis showed that formaldehyde 
and acetaldehyde made up the bulk of the cancer risk."). In its 1996 National Air Toxies 
Assessment, whieh examined the impact of thirty-two of the thirty-three most harmful air 
toxics in urban areas and is the Agency's most comprehensive examination of air toxics, 
the EPA identified formaldehyde as a "probable" human carcinogen and estimated that it 
posed an upper-bound lifetime cancer risk exceeding ten-in-one-million to more than 
twenty-five million people, with only the known carcinogens benzene and chromium pos-
ing such potentially high risks. See EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, National Air Toxies 
Assessment, Estimated Risk, Summary of Results (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ttnlatw/nata/risksum.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter National Air Toxics 
80 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 24:75 
However, partly in response to an industry petition and partly in 
response to its own initiative, the EPA also established an exemp-
tion that could apply to over half of PCWP sources. Specifically, 
the EPA used its subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) authority to "delist" 
and treat as a separate subcategory "low-risk" PCWP sources that 
release small amounts of air toxics. 19 The agency justified this 
exemption on the grounds that these PCWP facilities posed such 
low risks that the PCWP MACT standards were unnecessary and 
too costly.20 During 2003 and 2004, the EPA also adopted or con-
sidered similar exceptions under subsection 112(c)(9)(B) for other 
source categories releasing air toxics.21 The EPA's claim that it has 
the authority to exempt subcategories of so-called "low-risk" carci-
nogenic sources is significant because it could be used to exempt 
thousands of sources governed by MACT standards in dozens of 
industries. It would also give the Agency authority to exempt indi-
vidual sources from MACT, an authority that Congress in 1990 
explicitly refused to grant to the Agency.22 
Assessment, Estimated Risk, Summary of Results]. The PCWP Rule also found that acro-
lein and formaldehyde from PCWP sources could pose significant acute non-cancer risks in 
high doses, with acrolein probably posing the greatest possible non-cancer risk. The EPA 
stated that "only acrolein and formaldehyde showed the potential for acute exposures of 
any concern." PCWP Rule, supra at 45,950; see also PCWP Rule supra at 45,996-97 (stat-
ing that one commenter's sensitivity analysis showed that "[u]nder all scenarios, acrolein 
contributed the most non-cancer risk."). 
19 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,944, 45,955-56. 
20 [d. 
21 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Chlorine and Hydro-
chloric Acid Emissions from Chlorine Production, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,948, 70,951 (Dec. 19, 
2003) (to be promulgated at 40 c.F.R. pt. 63) (using subsection 112(c)(9) authority to de list 
non-mercury cell chlorine production subcategory from the list of major sources subject to 
MACT standards); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Station-
ary Combustion Turbines, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,184 (Aug. 18,2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 63) (invoking subsection 112(c)(9) authority to stay the imposition of MACT standards 
for two subcategories of stationary combustion turbines); National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Combustion Turbines, 69 Fed. Reg. 18,327 (April 
7,2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposing to delist four subcategories from the 
Stationary Combustion Thrbines source category MACT standard). 
22 See Natural Resources Defense Council & Environmental Integrity Project, Petition 
for Reconsideration, In the Matter of the Final Rule: National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood Products Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines and Standards for the Timber Products Point Source Category: List of Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Category List OAR-2003-0048, 
A-98-44 (Sept. 28, 2004) [hereinafter PCWP Petition for Reconsideration], available at 
http://www.4c1eanair.org/membersicommitteeiairtoxics/PetitionforReconsideration-
FINAL.pdf, at 38-56 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) (arguing that Congress in 1990 explicitly 
refused to grant to the EPA the authority to exempt individual sources from MACT stan-
dards, but that the EPA's low-risk exemption program in PCWP Rule effectively gave the 
Agency an equivalent power). 
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In its PCWP rule, the EPA contended that it has the authority to 
exempt a subcategory of "low-risk" sources releasing carcinogenic 
chemicals because it assumed that Congress had made a drafting 
error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) by using only the term "cate-
gory," but not the term "subcategory."23 In rare cases where statu-
tory language makes little sense or contravenes Congress's likely 
intent, courts have recognized the doctrine of scrivener's error to 
correct obvious errors in a statute. Because of a strong presump-
tion that Congress normally is careful in using statutory language, 
there is a heavy burden on an agency to demonstrate that a statute 
contains a scrivener's error, and courts limit an agency's discretion 
in rectifying such an error to the smallest change necessary to fix 
the error. 
On September 28, 2004, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) and the Environmental Integrity Project filed a petition 
for reconsideration (the Petition) with the EPA's then-Administra-
tor, Michael Leavitt, asking him to indefinitely stay the PCWP 
rule.24 The Petition argues that the plain language of subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly allows the EPA to delist only an entire 
source category of carcinogenic air toxics and only if every single 
source in the category is low-risk.25 Accordingly, the Petition con-
tends that the Agency may not delete a limited subcategory of 
sources emitting carcinogens, such as some but not all PCWP 
sources.26 
This article concludes that the EPA's creation of a low-risk sub-
category of PCWP sources is improper because the plain language 
of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) limits the Agency's delisting authority 
to whole categories of carcinogenic sources. The EPA has failed to 
meet its heavy burden in attempting to demonstrate that Congress 
23 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 (discussing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) and 
concluding that absence of the term "subcategory" in that provision is a drafting error). 
24 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22; Tom Hamburger & Alan C. 
Miller, The Nation; Groups Appeal Rule on Plant Emissions, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 29 
2004, at A14. See also Petition for Review, Natural Resources Defense Council & Sierra 
Club v. EPA, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 04-1323 (Sept. 28, 2004), 
available at http://www.4cleanair.org/members/committee/airtoxics/petitionforreview.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2005); Press Release, Earthjustice, EPA Sued over Inadequate Ply-
wood Air Pollution Rule (Sept 28, 2004), http://www.earthjustice.orglnews/display.htmI?lD 
==909 (announcing suit by NRDC and Sierra Club against the EPA over Plywood Rule) 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2005); Petition for Review, Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 
U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 04-1323 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.4cleanair.org/members/committee/airtoxics/PetitionforReviewofEIP.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2005). 
25 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22. 
26 Id. 
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made a drafting error when it omitted the term "subcategory" in 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) for carcinogenic chemicals. The doc-
trine of scrivener's error is inapplicable to the plain language of 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). There are plausible reasons why Con-
gress would have used the term "subcategory" in subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) for non-carcinogenic chemicals that were assumed 
to have a safe threshold but deliberately omitted the term "subcat-
egory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) for carcinogenic chemicals 
that were assumed in 1990 to have no safe threshold other than 
zero emissions.27 
Part II examines the differences between "non-threshold" car-
cinogens and "threshold" non-carcinogens and the difficulties that 
the EPA had in regulating air toxics under the 1970 Amendments 
to section 112. Part III explains the 1990 Amendments to section 
112, which shifted the statute to a largely technology-based focus. 
Part IV examines two provisions in Section 112-subsections 
112(d)(4) and 112(c)(9)(B)-that treat non-threshold carcinogens 
differently than threshold non-carcinogens. Part V introduces the 
PCWP Rule's process for delisting a "low-risk" subcategory of car-
cinogenic sources under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). Finally, Part 
VI examines the EPA's argument that the omission of the term 
"subcategories" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a drafting error. It 
concludes that the EPA has failed to meet its burden of proving a 
scrivener's error because there are plausible reasons why Congress 
might have allowed the delisting of subcategories of non-carcino-
genic sources, but limited the delisting of carcinogens to entire 
source categories. 
II. CARCINOGENS AND NON-CARCINOGENS: THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SECTION 112 
A. What Are Air Toxics? 
There are two main types of air toxics: carcinogens that cause 
various types of cancer and non-carcinogens that cause other seri-
ous neurological, reproductive or acute diseases. Carcinogenic air 
toxies, including, among many others, benzene and vinyl chloride, 
cause an estimated three thousand cases of fatal cancer each year.28 
27 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 44-51 (arguing that the 
EPA's claim that absence of the term "subcategory" in 42 U.S.c. § 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a 
drafting error is wrong because there are plausible reasons why Congress chose to omit 
that term). 
28 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(11) (defining "carcinogenic effect" as "hav[ing] the meaning 
provided by the Administrator under Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment as of 
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Non-carcinogenic air toxics include various metals, such as mer-
cury, chromium and cadmium, which can cause reproductive 
harms, birth defects or other developmental disorders, lung dis-
ease, neurological disorders, and other health problems.29 
Until the late 1990s, the EPA assumed that all carcinogens were 
non-threshold chemicals posing a risk of injury to human health at 
all concentrations and that there was no completely safe level other 
than zero exposure?O By contrast, the EPA generally assumed that 
most non-carcinogens were "threshold" chemicals having a safe 
limit at low levels of exposure and posing a risk to human health 
the date of enactment"); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 1-2 (discussing regulation of carcino-
genic air toxics); Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 235. Some carcinogens may also cause 
other harmful health effects; for example, new research indicates that long-term exposure 
to even low-levels of benzene may harm white blood cells and may require more stringent 
benzene limits than the current one part per million standard used by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration for occupational exposure. Bryn Nelson, Worker Safety 
Study: Benzene Depletes White Blood Celis, NEWSDA Y, Dec. 3, 2004, at A56. 
29 See TAKING TOXICS OUT, supra note 2, at 1-2; 136 CONGo REC. S16,895, S16,925 
(1990) (discussing regulation of non-carcinogenic air toxies); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 1-
2; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 235. 
30 See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 
17,968 (April 23, 1996) (stating the EPA generally assumes that if a substance causes can-
cer at any level of exposure that it will do so at every amount except zero exposure, unless 
strong evidence demonstrates that there is a safe threshold); Guidelines for Carcinogen 
Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (Sept. 24, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Guide-
lines]; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedures 
for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 
44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,659-60 (October 10, 1979) [hereinafter Policy and Procedures] {stat: 
ing "[t]he method used to establish a margin of safety for a threshold pollutant-setting 
the standard somewhere below the demonstrated effects level at a point at which the 
absence of adverse health effects is predicted-therefore cannot be used to set standards 
(other than at zero) for carcinogens under section 112, since risk of cancer is believed to 
exist at any exposure level greater than zero"); Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Envi-
ronmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 158 (2003) (stating that regulators since 1958 
have usually assumed that carcinogens have no safe threshold level, that the EPA officially 
adopted this position in 1986, but that the Agency will consider evidence that a carcinogen 
has a health threshold); Leslie F. Chard III, Comment, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments: Section 112 Comes of Age, 59 U. CrN. L. REv. 1253, 1253 (1991) (stating assumption 
of scientists and the EPA that carcinogens have no safe threshold); John P. Dwyer, The 
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 240 (1990) (defining non-thresh-
old pollutant); Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. Lours U. 
PUB. L. REV. 121, 125-26 (2001) (explaining that science cannot determine whether non-
threshold pollutants will cause cancer risks at very low doses); William A. Wichers et aI., 
Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under the New Clean Air Act: Technology-Based 
Standards at Last, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,717, 10,718 (1992). The EPA 
weighs the strength of the science regarding whether a chemical is a human carcinogen, a 
probable human carcinogen, or merely a possible human carcinogen. 1986 Guidelines, 
supra, at 34,000; Babich, supra, at 157. 
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only above a threshold concentration?1 In the 1990 Amendments 
to the Act, Congress, in subsection 112(a)(11), expressly relied on 
the definition of carcinogenic effect in the EPA's 1986 Guidelines 
for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, which presumes that all carcin-
ogens are non-threshold chemicals?2 As discussed in Part IV, Con-
gress in subsections 112(d)(4) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) appears to have 
assumed that non-carcinogens alone have a threshold level. More 
recently, beginning in approximately 1998, some evidence suggests 
that only carcinogens that harm DNA have no safe threshold and 
that other carcinogens that harm cellular structure, but not DNA, 
may have a safe threshold?3 Congress has not amended section 
112(a)(11) to reflect the possibility that some carcinogens have a 
threshold.34 
31 See, e.g., Policy and Procedures, supra note 30, at 58,659-60; Babich, supra note 30, at 
157 ("For non-cancer effects, regulators' working assumption is that there is a threshold 
below which exposures are completely safe, and that the government can eliminate risk by 
reducing exposures below observed 'no effect' levels."); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. 
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1255, 1285 (2004) (stating that "a 'threshold pollutant' causes adverse effects only 
above a certain exposure level, designated as the threshold level. In contrast, a 'non-
threshold' pollutant is one that may cause adverse effects at any level above zero expo-
sure); William K. Reilly, Foreword to ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN, SENSITIVE POPULATIONS 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, at vii (1981) ("The Clean Air Act incorporates the 
notion of threshold values of pollutants, levels below which there are presumed to be no 
adverse health effects, and requires that standards be set on the basis of the threshold, with 
a margin of safety."). 
32 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(11) (defining "carcinogenic effect" as "hav[ing] the meaning 
provided by the Administrator under Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment [1986 
Guidelines, supra note 30] as of the date of enactment."). 
33 Recently, scientists have discovered and the EPA has recognized that some carcino-
gens may have a "safe" threshold level if they act through "cytotoxicity" (i.e., by damaging 
cells) which can be reversed by regenerative cell proliferation, rather than harming non-
reparable DNA. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and 
Disinfection Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,401 (Dec. 16, 1998) (stating that the EPA 
may find carcinogen has safe threshold level if sufficient scientific evidence exists); Chlo-
rine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing the EPA's 
findings that chloroform, a carcinogen, has a safe threshold, because it has a cytotoxic 
mechanism that harms cells, which are capable of regeneration, rather than harming DNA, 
which cannot repair itself). Some scholars observe, however, that there is still a great deal 
of scientific uncertainty in setting a threshold for a carcinogen. See Wendy E. Wagner, The 
"Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over Science in Public Health and Environ-
mental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 111 (2003) ("While mechanistic studies 
and epidemiological research can sometimes support a 'best' scientific guess that there is, 
in fact, a threshold below which a particular carcinogen is safe, this research generally 
remains inconclusive. Thus, there is little scientific guidance for determining the point at 
which existing research satisfactorily demonstrates that there is a safe dose for a given 
toxin, or determining what that safe dose might be."). 
34 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(11). 
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In several areas, section 112 distinguishes between non-carcino-
genic or "threshold" chemicals that are presumed to have a "safe" 
threshold below a certain concentration and "non-threshold"35 
chemicals or carcinogens that are presumed to cause cancer at 
every dose level except zero. As is discussed in Part IV.A, section 
112(d)(4) distinguishes between threshold and non-threshold 
chemicals instead of distinguishing between carcinogens and non-
carcinogens.36 By contrast, as is discussed in Part IV.B below, sec-
tions 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) distinguish carcinogens 
from non-carcinogens.37 
B. 1970-90: The EPA Struggles to Apply the "Ample Margin of 
Safety" Standard 
Section 112 of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act38 
requires the EPA to establish health-based39 national emission 
standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) that provide an 
"ample margin of safety" for human health.40 During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the EPA focused its section 112 regulatory efforts pri-
marily on non-threshold carcinogens that posed the greatest dan-
gers to the public, at least based on the scientific knowledge of that 
time.41 Because Congress in the 1970 Amendments had given little 
35 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(defining a "non-threshold" pollutant as one that "appears to create a risk to health at all 
non-zero levels of emission"); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; 
Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,533-34 (Dec. 24, 1975) 
[hereinafter Proposed 1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride] ("The term 'non-threshold pollu-
tant' refers to a substance which creates a risk of adverse health effects at all ambient levels 
(other than zero)."). One can never prove without question that a chemical has no thresh-
old because it is "impossible to scientifically prove the absence of a threshold, as one can 
never prove a negative." Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 31, at 1285 (quoting David L. 
Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in Casarett and Doull's TOXICOL-
OGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 11,21 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 6th ed. 2001». 
36 42 V.S.c. § 7412(d)(4) (stating that "[w]ith respect to pollutants for which a health 
threshold has been established, the Administrator may consider such threshold level, with 
an ample margin of safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsection."). 
37 See 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i)-(ii). 
38 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (codified 
as amended at 42 V.S.c. § 7412). 
39 Some commentators and courts would describe these standards as "risk-based." See 
supra note 6. 
40 42 V.S.c. § 7412(b)(1)(B); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
Dwyer, supra note 30, at 237-38; Mank, supra note 7, at 267-68; McCubbin, supra note 2, 
at 3-4, 6-7; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 237. 
41 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
("With the exception of mercury, every pollutant the Administrator has listed or intends to 
list under § 112 is a non-threshold carcinogen."); Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn S. 
Carruth, Science in the Regulatory Process: Implications of the Precautionary Principle for 
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or no thought to the issue of non-threshold chemicals,42 section 112 
provided little guidance on how the EPA should apply the "ample 
margin of safety" standard, especially to non-threshold chemicals.43 
Because the EPA assumed that all carcinogens are non-threshold 
chemicals that pose some danger to the public health at every level 
of exposure except zero emissions,44 the agency faced the difficult 
question of whether section 112's "ample margin of safety" stan-
dard required the EPA to ban all carcinogens.45 Because the cost 
of closing the numerous industries that rely on carcinogens likely 
outweighed the health benefits of banning all carcinogenic air tox-
ics, the EPA during the 1970s and 1980s interpreted section 112 to 
authorize it to at least implicitly consider the costs and technologi-
cal feasibility of regulation.46 . Because section 112's statutory lan-
guage and legislative history did not clearly address how the EPA 
should balance health, cost and feasibility issues, the EPA often 
deliberately delayed issuing section 112 standards for air toxics for 
fear of judicial reversal.47 The EPA only regulated seven air toxics 
between 1970 and 1990-asbestos, beryllium, mercury, 
radionuclides, inorganic arsenic, benzene, and vinyl chloride-and 
Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples from the Control of Hazardous 
Air Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONfEMP. PROB. 247, 
250-51 (2003) (stating that before 1990 Amendments, the EPA focused on regulating carci-
nogenic hazardous air pollutants). 
42 See McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12. 
43 See 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[1][a][i]("Depending on one's interests and 
point of view, one could interpret [Section 112's] language differently. Those concerned 
about safety and the environment argued that an 'ample margin of safety' would often 
require zero emissions for those non-threshold pollutants that have some possibility of an 
adverse health impact at any exposure level above zero, while those in industry asserted 
that technological and economic feasibility factors should be considered."); McCubbin, 
supra note 2, at 6-12 (discussing the difficulties faced by the EPA during the 1970s and 
1980s in interpreting section 112); Goldberg, supra note 6, at 622. 
44 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 254-55; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12. 
45 See Proposed 1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,534 (Dec. 24, 
1975) (stating that section 112 might require a complete ban on emissions of non-threshold 
pollutants as that would be "the only emissions standard which would offer absolute safety 
from ambient exposure"); Chard, supra note 30, at 1253, 1255-56 (discussing the EPA's 
concern from 1970 until 1990 that section 112 might require a complete banning of all non-
threshold carcinogens); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 254-55; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12. 
46 If the Agency banned all carcinogens to eliminate all possible risks, it would have to 
shut down most of the chemical industry as well as all coal-burning power plants, nuclear 
power plants, and petroleum refineries. See Mank, supra note 7, at 268; McCubbin, supra 
note 2, at 8-9; Chard, supra note 30, at 1255-56. 
47 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 234-35 (arguing that during 1970s and 1980s, the EPA 
delayed implementing Section 112 because it believed statutory scheme was unworkable 
and because it feared judicial reversal); Mank, supra note 7, at 264, 267-70; McCubbin, 
supra note 2, at 6-10; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 238, 241-42. 
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the agency issued five of these regulations because of court 
orders.48 
Despite the uncertainty regarding whether section 112 autho-
rizes the EPA to consider the cost and technological feasibility of 
regulating air toxics, during the 1970s and 1980s the EPA increas-
ingly began to consider such factors.49 Notably, between 1975 and 
1985, the EPA considered cost and technological feasibility when it 
proposed and revised regulations for vinyl chloride. 50 Vinyl chlo-
ride, a gaseous chemical used to produce polyvinyl chloride plas-
tics, is a carcinogen known at high doses to cause liver cancer in 
human beingsY In 1987, in a unanimous en banc decision written 
by Judge Bork, the D.C. Circuit held in Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride)52 that section 112 did not 
authorize the EPA to make cost and technological feasibility the 
predominant considerations in setting emission standards for air 
toxics because health was clearly the primary factor in section 112's 
48 See 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3175 ("In the 20 years since this section was 
enacted, the EPA has acted to establish standards under section 112 for seven hazardous 
air pollutants. This is only a small fraction of the many substances associated (at some level 
of concentration) with cancer, birth defects, neurological damage, or other serious health 
impacts."); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 
234--35; Mank, supra note 7, at 264, 267-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-10; Reitze & 
Lowell, supra note 7, at 238, 241-42. The EPA listed or issued notices and health effects 
information on twenty-five other air toxins, but it never issued regulations regarding them. 
Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 238. 
49 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 252-57 (discussing the EPA's increasing reliance during 
1970s and 1980s on cost and technological factors when regulating air toxics under section 
112); John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcin-
ogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 35 DUKE L.J. 100, 131 (1985); Mank, supra 
note 7, at 269-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 8-10; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,719; 
Chard, supra note 30, at 1255-56. 
50 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Vinyl Chloride, 50 
Fed. Reg. 1182, 1184 (Jan. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (explaining the 
Agency's decision to withdraw 1977 proposal because of cost and technological concerns); 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 
41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,564-69 (Oct. 21, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Standard for Vinyl Chlo-
ride] (discussing costs and technological feasibility of regulating vinyl chloride); Proposed 
1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride, supra note 43, 40 Fed. Reg. at 59,533-34 (stating difficul-
ties of implementing section 112 without considering cost and technological feasibility); 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, (Vinyl Chloride) 824 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (en banc) (discussing the EPA's consideration of cost and technical feasibility in 1976 
and 1985 regulations for vinyl chloride); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 235, 251-57 (discussing 
the EPA's consideration of cost and technical feasibility in regulating vinyl chloride); 
Mank, supra note 7, at 269-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 8. 
51 There is strong evidence that vinyl chloride causes liver cancer in human beings and 
some evidence that it causes cancer in the brain and the lungs. 1976 Standard for Vinyl 
Chloride, supra note 50, at 46,559-60; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 242. 
52 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en 
banc). 
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"ample margin of safety" standard.53 However, the court rejected 
the NRDC's two related contentions that section 112 requires the 
EPA to (1) focus on only health considerations when establishing 
emission standards for air toxics, and (2) adopt zero emission stan-
dards for any non-threshold carcinogens.54 Instead, the court con-
cluded that the statute's "ample margin of safety" language 
requires the EPA to prevent only significant or "unacceptable" 
risks, rather than any risk at all, because life in an industrialized 
society inevitably exposes persons to som~ risk.55 The court held 
that section 112 requires the EPA to use a two-part process. First, 
the agency must determine at what level of concentration a chemi-
cal poses an "acceptable risk to health."56 This obligates the EPA 
to avoid significant or unacceptable risks to human health. Second, 
the agency can consider technological or cost factors in assessing 
what constitutes an "ample margin" of public safety.57 The Vinyl 
Chloride decision is still important today because it is the only 
major case to analyze section 112's ample margin of safety stan-
dard. The 1990 Amendments still define "an ample margin of 
safety" in light of the statute's pre-1990 history. 58 
53 Although acknowledging that the Agency's interpretation of section 112 deserves 
considerable deference because of its expertise in regulating air toxics, the court concluded 
that the EPA's interpretation of and implementation of section 112 was flawed because the 
EPA administrator had not "exercised his expertise to determine an acceptable risk to 
health," but had inappropriately "substituted technological feasibility for health as the pri-
mary consideration under Section 112." [d. at 1163-66 (rejecting the EPA's primary 
emphasis on technology standards in regulating air toxies); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 
270-271 (discussing Vinyl Chloride court's rejection of the EPA's primary emphasis on 
technology standards in regulating air toxics); Mank, supra note 7, at 270; Reitze & Lowell, 
supra note 7, at 243. 
54 Vinyl Chloride. 824 F.2d at 1152, 1154-63 (describing NRDC's zero-risk interpreta-
tion of section 112 and rejecting it); Dwyer. supra note 30, at 270; Reitze & Lowell, supra 
note 7, at 243; see also Mank, supra note 7, at 270. 
55 Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1164-65; Dwyer, supra note 30, at 270 (discussing Vinyl 
Chloride court's conclusion that section 112 prohibits only significant risks); Mank, supra 
note 7, at 270; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 243. 
56 The court acknowledged that the EPA had significant latitude in defining "what is 
'safe' or what constitutes an 'ample margin.' [The court held] only that the Administrator 
cannot consider cost and technological feasibility in determining what is 'safe.' This deter-
mination must be based solely upon the risk to health." Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1166. 
57 [d. at 1154-65 (requiring the EPA to follow two-part test for regulating air toxics 
under section 112); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 271 (discussing Vinyl Chloride court's two-
part test for regulating air toxies under section 112); Mank, supra note 7, at 270; Reitze & 
Lowell, supra note 7, at 243. 
58 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A); 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR 
AND WATER § 3.IE(A) & (B) (1986 & Supp. 2004) (stating 1990 Amendments to Act 
define "residual risk" in light of pre-1990 "ample margin of safety" standard). 
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III. THE 1990 AMENDMENTS: TECHNOLOGY FIRST, 
THEN RISK-BASED 
Since the EPA had regulated only seven air toxics between 1970 
and 1990, there was strong support for amending section 112 when 
Congress sought to update and refine the Act in 1989 and 1990. 
The EPA supported amendments to section 112 because the 
Agency was unenthusiastic about implementing the Vinyl Chloride 
decision's complex, two-part approach of determining "acceptable" 
safety based solely on health factors and then considering cost and 
technological feasibility in assessing an "ample margin of safety."59 
During the deliberations on the 1990 Amendments to the Act, the 
Senate Committee on the Environment blamed section 112's use of 
health-based ample margin of safety standards as the reason for 
the EPA's record of only regulating seven air toxics. The Commit-
tee's report stated: 
The law has worked poorly. In 18 years, the EPA has regulated 
only some sources of only seven chemicals. One reason the law has 
worked poorly is the standard of protection required. "An ample 
margin of safety" has been interpreted by many to mean zero 
exposure to carcinogens, because any amount of exposure may 
cause a cancer. The EPA has not been willing to write standards so 
stringent because they would shutdown major segments of Ameri-
can industry. The legislation reported by the Committee would 
entirely restructure the existing law, so that toxics might be ade-
quately regulated by the Federal Government.60 
To avoid the problems with the pre-1990 version of section 112, 
Congress in the 1990 Amendments to the Act shifted to a two-
phased approach that generally requires the EPA to first establish 
technology-based standards and then only later address the 
remaining residual risks from sources of air toxics. In Sierra Club 
v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit summarized the 1990 Amendments' two-
phase process for regulating hazardous air pollutants (HAPs): 
Congress established a two-phase approach for setting HAP 
emission standards under the 1990 Amendments. . .. Dur-
59 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions 
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, 
Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,496, 
28,512 (July 28, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (criticizing acceptable risk stan-
dard for excluding benefits and technological feasibility); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 273-74 
(discussing the EPA's view that Vinyl Chloride decision's two-part test would be very diffi-
cult for the Agency to apply). 
60 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8469. 
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ing the first phase, EPA must promulgate technology-based 
emission standards for categories of sources that emit 
HAPs. These emission standards are to be based not on an 
assessment of the risks posed by HAPs, but instead on the 
maximum achievable control technology (MAcr) for 
sources in each category. ("The MACT standards are based 
on the performance of technology, and not on the health 
and environmental effects of hazardous air pollutants."). 
The standards, at a minimum, must reflect the emissions lim-
itation achieved by the best-performing sources in a particu-
lar category . . . . The idea is to set limits that, as an initial 
matter, require all sources in a category to at least clean up 
their emissions to the level that their best performing peers 
have shown can be achieved. 
The second phase then returns to a risk-based analysis. That 
phase-which occurs within eight years after MACT stan-
dards are promulgated-requires EPA to consider whether 
residual risks remain that warrant more stringent standards 
than achieved through MAcr. EPA must determine 
~hether such standards are required "in order to provide an 
ample margin of safety to protect public health ... or to 
prevent . . . an adverse environmental effect." ("[The 
Amendments] require[ ] [EPA] to protect against all signifi-
cant environmental effects when setting residual risk stan-
dards in the second phase.,,).61 
A. Technology-Based Standards: MACT and GACT 
The 1990 amendments to subsection 112(d) generally require the 
EPA to begin first with technology-based emission standards.62 For 
either new or existing "major"63 stationary sources of air toxics, 
subsection 112( d) requires the EPA to establish emissions stan-
dards based on MACT, which are standards "based on the per-
formance of technology, and not on the health and environmental 
effects of hazardous air pollutants."64 Subsection 112(d) requires 
61 Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). 
62 42 V.S.c. § 7412(d)(2). 
63 A "major" source is defined as "any stationary source or group of stationary sources 
located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential 
to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous 
air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of hazardous air pollutants." 
42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(I). 
64 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8488; Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("These emission standards are to be based not on an assessment of the 
risks posed by HAPs, but instead on the maximum achievable control technology (MAeI') 
for sources in each category.") (citing 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9). 
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the Administrator to issue regulations that establish technology-
based emission standards for each category or subcategory65 of 
major and area sources of hazardous air pollutants that have been 
listed for regulation under subsection 112( c ).66 In issuing subsec-
tion 112( d) standards, the Administrator may distinguish among 
classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcat-
egory.67 Under subsection 112(d), the EPA must establish technol-
ogy-based standards for both sources of either carcinogenic or non-
carcinogenic air toxics, although, as Part IV discusses, there are dif-
ferent exceptions to MACT standards depending on whether an air 
toxie is carcinogenic or non-carcinogenie.68 
Pursuant to subsection 112( d)(2), the Administrator must set 
MACT technology-based emission standards to achieve the "maxi-
mum" degree of emission reductions that are achievable for 
sources in the category or subcategory. However, the Agency may 
also consider the cost of achieving such emission reductions, espe-
cially for existing sources.69 For new sources in a category or sub-
category, the EPA must set MACT emission standards to be no less 
stringent than the emission control that is achieved in practice by 
the best-controlled similar source.70 Although MACT is a stringent 
standard that requires each source category to make substantial 
reductions in their emissions from uncontrolled levels, the legisla-
tive history of the 1990 Amendments indicates that Congress in 
1990 did not intend MACT emission standards to cost so much that 
numerous sources or industries must shut down.71 
The process for setting technology-based standards for existing 
sources of air toxies consists of two steps. First, the EPA finds the 
minimum MACT "floor" by examining the performance of the best 
performing sources in a category. Second, the EPA sets even more 
stringent standards if they are achievable in light of costs and other 
factors: 
65 The EPA maintains a current list of all categories and subcategories of MACf sources 
in 40 c.F.R. § 63.1(a)(6). See also Agency's Unified Air Toxics Website: Source Category 
List and Promulgation Schedule (Mar. 30, 2005), http://www.epa.gov/un/atw/socatisU 
socatpg.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[3][ a] (dis-
cussing how Section 112 and the EPA define term "source category" of air toxics). 
66 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(1)-(2). 
67 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(1). 
68 [d. 
69 The House Report states that "consideration of cost should be based on an evaluation 
of the cost of various control options." 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; FRANK 
P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03[15][c] n.27 (2004). 
70 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c] n.29. 
71 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c] n.27. 
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Step one requires EPA to establish what has come to be 
known as the MACT floor-the minimum level of reduction 
required by statute. For existing sources, EPA sets the 
MACT floor at "the average emission limitation achieved by 
the best performing 5 sources" in a category "with fewer 
than 30 sources." Once EPA has set the MACT floor, it may 
then impose stricter standards-so-called "beyond-the-
floor" limits-if the Administrator determines them to be 
achievable after "taking into consideration the cost ... and 
any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and 
energy requirements." ... These "beyond-the-floor" limits 
in phase one under Section 7412(d)(2) are distinct from the 
risk-based limits to be set eight years later under Section 
7412(f)(2) during phase twO.72 
For existing sources that are part of categories or subcategories 
with thirty or more sources, subsection 112(d)(3)(A) requires the 
EPA to set a MACT floor standard that is at least as stringent as 
the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 
twelve percent of the existing sources in the category or subcat-
egory.73 For categories and subcategories of existing sources with 
fewer than thirty sources, subsection 112(d)(3)(B) requires the 
EPA to promulgate a MACT floor emission standard that is at least 
as stringent as the average emission limitation achieved by the best 
performing five sources for the category or subcategory.74 Pursu-
ant to subsection 112(d)(7), however, any source subject to a more 
stringent emission limitation or requirement under other provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act or a state authority may not substitute a 
MACT standard that would be less stringent.75 Additionally, at 
least every eight years, the Administrator must review and revise 
as necessary the MACT emissions standards promulgated under 
subsection 112(d).76 
72 Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 
73 The statute excludes from this calculation any sources that have achieved the strin-
gent Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER). This applies to major new or modified 
sources of criteria pollutants in non-attainment areas, within eighteen months before the 
Agency proposes a MACf emission standard or within thirty months before the Agency 
adopts a MACT standard. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3). The Lowest Achievable Emission Rate 
(LAER), which applies to major new or modified sources of criteria pollutants in non-
attainment areas, is defined in section 171 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. § 7501(3)(A). 
74 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3)(B); 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352-53. 
75 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(7); GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]; Garrett & Winner, 
supra note 12, at 10,248. 
76 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(6); GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]. 
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Not all sources of air toxics require MACT. For smaller "area" 
sources of air toxics, which are not major sources because they 
emit less than twenty-five tons of air toxics per year and also less 
than ten tons per year of any single air toxic,77 the Administrator 
may promulgate emissions standards based on generally available 
control technologies (GACT) or management practices.78 Emis-
sions standards based on GACT may be less stringent than those 
for major new or existing sources governed by MACT.79 Unlike 
MACT standards, the EPA has more discretion in setting GACT 
standards because the Agency does not have to use the best 
existing sources to define a floor or minimum level of stringency 
for GACT.80 As discussed below in Part VI.CA, the EPA enjoys 
greater discretion in delisting area sources of carcinogens and non-
carcinogens from GACT or otherwise applicable emission stan-
dards than it does in delisting major sources of carcinogens.81 
B. Section 112(f)'s Residual Risk Program 
Section 112(f) of the Act provides for a second phase of health-
based "residual risk" emission standards more stringent than 
MACT if the technology-based standards for a source category or 
subcategory fail to provide adequate protection to human health or 
the environment.82 Pursuant to Section 112(f)(2)(A), within eight 
years after the Agency promulgates a MACT standard for a source 
category or subcategory, the EPA is required to determine whether 
remaining air toxic emissions from MACT-controlled sources in 
the category or subcategory pose an unacceptable risk to human 
health.83 What is most important for the purposes of this article is 
that the residual risk standards focus on carcinogens, and barely 
mention threshold chemicals. The residual risk provisions are yet 
another portion of section 112 that treats carcinogens differently 
from non-carcinogens. 
If, after the EPA has implemented MACT, any source in a 
source category poses a cancer risk greater than one-in-one-million 
77 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(2) (defining area source). 
78 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(5). 
79 [d.; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(5); David P. Novello, The Air Taxies Program at the Cross-
roads: From MACT to Residual Risk, 18 WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 57, 60 (2004). 
81 See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. 
82 See 42 U.S.c. §7412(f). 
83 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A); Mank, supra note 7, at 264-67, 275-77 (discussing sec-
tion 112(f)'s residual risk program); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 2-6, 37-42, 47-49; Novello, 
supra note 80, at 6l. 
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to the maximally exposed individual, the EPA must promulgate 
health-based "residual risk" emission standards to supplement the 
technology-based standards that are adequate "to provide an 
ample margin of safety to protect public health in accordance with 
this section (as in effect before 1990) or to prevent, taking into con-
sideration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, an 
adverse environmental effect."84 Subsection 112(f)(2)(A) explic-
itly states that the EPA should use the "ample margin of safety" 
standard in effect before November 15, 1990 as the minimum stan-
dard for any residual risk emission standards.85 Accordingly, the 
D.C. Circuit's 1987 Vinyl Chloride decision is still relevant in defin-
ing the meaning of "ample margin of safety" for the public 
health.86 
Subsection 112(f)(2)(A) contains a specific risk trigger for car-
cinogens that requires the EPA to promulgate health-based emis-
sion standards providing an "ample margin of safety" if the MACT 
standards do not "reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individ-
ual most exposed to emissions from a source in the category or 
subcategory to less than one-in-one-million."87 The statute's one-
in-one-million risk standard is a "trigger" requiring the EPA to 
take further regulatory action. However, the EPA probably has 
the discretion to use a less stringent risk standard for any residual 
risk emission standards, perhaps even a standard of one-in-ten-
thousand lifetime cancer risk.88 The conference report for the 1990 
amendments refers to the Vinyl Chloride decision and the Agency's 
1989 benzene rulemaking, which used a one-in-ten-thousand life-
time excess cancer risk as the maximum allowable risk,89 as models 
for the EPA's creation of residual risk standards.90 Subsection 
112(f)(2)(B) states that the amended section 112 does not affect 
84 See 42 u.s.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A). 
85 [d. 
86 Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1146. 
frI See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(discussing section 112(f)'s residual risk program); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20, 
25-26. 
88 See McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20, 25-26, 37-38, 42, 46-49 (discussing section 
112(f)'s residual risk program's one-in-one-million cancer risk as trigger for the EPA to 
take regulatory action and the legislative history's discussion of benzene rule making's one-
in-ten-thousand standard as model for regulatory action). 
89 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from 
Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene 
Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,044-46 
(Sept. 14, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61 subparts L, Y) [hereinafter 1989 Benzene 
NESHAPj. 
90 The Conference Report stated: 
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the EPA's pre-November 15, 1990 interpretation of "this section" 
that is "set forth in the Federal register of September 14, 1989 (54 
Federal Register 38044)," which is the benzene rulemaking.91 In 
the 1989 Benzene NESHAP, the EPA did not use a one-in-one-
million standard to protect the individual most exposed to emis-
sions, but rather used a presumption that a one-in-ten-thousand 
lifetime excess cancer risk for the maximum individual lifetime 
cancer risk (MIR) from a particular chemical was acceptable.92 
Furthermore, in the 1989 Benzene NESHAP, the EPA stated that 
it would examine other health and risk factors besides the one-in-
ten-thousand lifetime excess cancer risk to the maximally exposed 
individual in deciding whether to adopt more stringent emission 
requirements.93 In 1989, the EPA required sources emitting 
radionuc1ides to limit the risk to ninety percent of the people 
within eighty kilometers of a source to a one-in-one million life-
time risk of cancer, and proposed a similar standard for some ben-
zene sources.94 Similarly, the EPA stated that its residual standards 
In the first step of [its] analysis, the [EPA] Administrator must determine a safe or accept· 
able level of risk considering only health factors. In the second step, the Administrator may 
consider cost, feasibility or other relevant factors in addition to health in order to set a 
standard to provide an "ample margin of safety." This approach is required under the 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in [Vinyl Chloride] (interpreting section 112 as in 
effect prior to these Amendments), and is set forth in the rulemaking on emissions stan· . 
dards for benzene, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989). 
Conference Report on S. 1630, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, S. REP. No. 101-952, 
at 339 (1990) (Conf. Rep.); see 136 CONGo REC. SI6,895, S16,932 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) 
(statement of Sen. Durenberger) (stating ample margin of safety at least as protective as 
benzene regulations); 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at 38,044-38,046; Mank, 
supra note 7, at 270-71, 276 (discussing section 112(f)'s residual risk program's one-in-one-
million cancer risk as trigger for the EPA to take regulatory action and the legislative 
history's discussion of benzene rule making's one-in-ten-thousand standard as model for 
regulatory action); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20, 25-26, 37-38, 42, 46-49. 
91 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(B); Mank, supra note 7, at 276. 
92 See 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at 38,044-38,046 (using a historical risk 
survey to set a "presumptive level" of maximum acceptable individual risk at one-in-ten-
thousand); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 276 (discussing one-in-ten-thousand risk level); Mank, 
supra note 7, at 270-71, 276; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 245. 
93 These factors include: (1) the overall incidence of cancer or other serious health 
effects within the exposed population, (2) the number of persons exposed within each indi-
vidual lifetime range (such as a 50-kilometer exposure radius around the emitting facili-
ties), (3) the science and policy assumptions and estimation uncertainties associated with 
the risk measures, (4) the weight of the scientific evidence for human health effects, (5) 
other quantified or unquantified health effects, and (6) the effects resulting from co-loca-
tion of facilities and co-emission of pollutants. 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at 
38,045-46; Mank, supra note 7, at 276 n.60. 
94 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Radionuclides, 54 
Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,655 (Dec. 15, 1989) (requiring radionuclide sources to limit risk to 
ninety percent of population within eighty kilometers to one-in-one-million lifetime cancer 
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will go beyond the one-in-ten-thousand standard where cost-effec-
tive technology is available and seek to protect "the greatest num-
ber of persons possible" under a one-in-one-million standard.95 
Section 112(f) does not explicitly address non-cancer risks. 
However, the EPA probably has an implicit duty under the statute 
to reduce residual risks from non-cancer causing chemicals that 
pose serious risks. This implicit duty is based on section 112(f)(2)'s 
general requirement that the EPA establish emission standards 
that provide "an ample margin of safety" as defined by section 112 
before 1990 and additional language that authorizes the Agency to 
issue more stringent standards than those used before 1990 if they 
are necessary "to prevent ... an adverse environmental effect. "96 
Nevertheless, subsection 112(f)(2) is far less specific about non-
cancer risks than cancer risks and is an example of Congress regu-
lating carcinogenic air toxics differently from non-carcinogenic 
pollutants. . 
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO MACT: THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS 
AND DELISTING 
During the debates on the 1990 Amendments, Senator 
Durenberger (D-Minnesota) stated that the EPA may promulgate 
residual risk standards under subsection 112(f) only if it seeks to 
impose standards more stringent than MACT standards.97 How-
ever, he also recognized that the E;PA could exempt low-risk 
sources from MACT standards under' either subsection 112( d)( 4), 
risk) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 61); Mank, supra note 7, at 276 n.59; Reitze & Lowell, 
supra note 7, at 245; see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; 
Benzene Emissions From Chemical Manufacturing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent Use, 
Benzene Waste Operations, Benzene Transfer Operations, and Gasoline Marketing Sys-
tem, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,083,38,091 (Sept. 14, 1989) ("The majority of the people (greater than 
99.9 %) exposed to benzene emissions from this category would be exposed to risk levels 
lower than [one-in-one-millionJ."). 
95 See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, RESIDUAL RISK 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA-4531R-99-001, at ES-l1 (1999), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/ttn/oarpglt3/reports/risk_rep.pdf (stating goal of limiting excessive cancer risk where 
cost effective to one-in-one-million for as many people as possible); McCubbin, supra note 
2, at 42 n.174 (discussing the EPA's goal in 1999 Residual Risk Report of limiting excessive 
cancer risk where cost effective to one-in-one-million for as many people as possible); 
March Sadowitz & John Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted By Health, 
Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17, 26 (1995) (stating that the EPA in its residual 
risk standards will adopt approach in 1989 radionuclides rule of limiting excess cancer risk 
to one-in-ten-thousand to maximally exposed individuals and seek to limit risk to as many 
persons as possible to one-in-one-million). 
96 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2); Mank, supra note 7, at 289-90 (observing that section 
112(f)'s residual risk program is less specific about addressing risks of non-carcinogens). 
97 136 CONGo REC. S16,895, S16,932 (1990) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger). 
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which provides a narrow exception to MACT and residual risk 
standards for sources releasing threshold air toxics, or subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)'s delisting process, which is the only exemption that 
can apply to carcinogens.98 
The Administrator is to replace the technology standards for 
a source category, only if it is necessary to protect health 
with a more stringent standard. This bill does not authorize 
the Administrator to relax the standards established under 
subsection (d) for a category by establishing standards under 
subsection (f). With respect to the pollutants for which a 
safe threshold can be set, the authority to set a standard less 
stringent than maximum achievable control technology is 
contained in subsection (d)(4). With respect to carcinogens 
and other non-threshold pollutants, no such authority exists 
in subsection (d) or in any other provision of the Act. There 
is no safe level of exposure for these pollutants. And there 
is no possibility under the two-step decisionmaking proce-
dures established by the Court in the vinyl chloride case for 
EPA to set a standard less stringent than is already being 
achieved by sources in the category under subsection (d). 
Any such interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the 
ample margin of safety test which is a mandatory second 
step in a standard-setting regime which most definitely 
includes ~oth steps.99 
No postponements or exceptions are available regarding 
standards under subsection (f) for reasons of voluntary 
reductions or for any other reason not expressly authorized 
by the statute. Risk assessments may not be used to post-
pone, lessen the stringency of, or gain an exception from any 
standard issued under subsection (d) (or any alternative 
emission limit adopted pursuant to a voluntary reduction or 
for any other reason), except as provided by subsection 
112( c )(9)(B)(i).100 
As is discussed below in Subparts A and B, section 112 provides 
for alternative standards or delisting exceptions to MACT risk 
standards under subsection 112(d)(4)'s "ample margin of safety" 
standard for threshold pollutants and subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s 
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A. Section 112(d)(4): Threshold Pollutants May Use an "Ample 
Margin of Safety" Standard Instead of MACT 
"With respect to pollutants for which a health threshold has been 
established," subsection 112(d)(4) states that the EPA "Adminis-
trator may consider such threshold level, with an ample margin of 
safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsec-
tion."l01 For threshold chemicals, subsection 112(d)(4) implies that 
the EPA may substitute either new or pre-1990 health-based emis-
sion standards providing an "ample margin of safety" to the public 
health in lieu of MACT technology-based standards.102 In a recent 
article, Professor McGarity concludes that subsection 112( d)( 4) 
likely allows the EPA to exempt threshold air toxics from MACT if 
the Agency can establish an emissions standard that will provide an 
ample margin of safety.103 That said, he acknowledges that the lan-
guage of the statute is not conclusive. Citing subsection 112(d)(4), 
he argues: 
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require EPA to 
establish NESHAPs for stationary sources reflecting the 
maximum achievable control technology (MACT) for emit-
ters of hazardous air pollutants, a standard which rather 
clearly represents a best efforts goal. In the case of carcino-
gens, these standards must be met even if compliance 
reduces the risks to exposed individuals to extremely low 
levels. The statute allows the agency to consider established 
health thresholds for pollutants for which such thresholds 
have been established, along with an ample margin of safety. 
This suggests-but only very vaguely-that Congress may 
have adopted a mixed strategy with respect to sources that 
emit threshold pollutants. Maximum achievable technology 
may not be required if something less will ensure human 
exposures below the threshold level plus an ample margin of 
safety. 104 
It is notable that Congress in the 1990 Amendments authorized 
the EPA to use "ample margin of safety" emission standards for 
101 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(4) ("[w]ith respect to pollutants for which a health threshold has 
been established, the Administrator may consider such threshold level, with an ample mar-
gin of safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsection."). 
102 See RODGERS, supra note 58, at § 3.1E(A) (stating 1990 Amendments to Act gener-
ally left the EPA with authority to use pre-1990 emission standards and "ample margin of 
safety" standard in lieu of technology-based standards). 
103 Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REv. 529 (2004). 
104 Id. at 548--49 (citing subsection 112(d)(4)) (internal citations omitted). 
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threshold pollutants, which in 1990 were generally assumed to 
include only non-carcinogens. However, Congress did not give the 
Agency similar discretion with respect to non-threshold pollutants, 
which in 1990 were generally believed to include all carcinogens. lOS 
The Senate Report addressing the 1990 Amendments provides 
the most clear explanation for the EPA's authority to use a less 
stringent health-based standard under Section 112( d)( 4) in lieu of 
MACT standards. The Senate Report explains: 
For some pollutants a MACT emissions limitation may be 
far more stringent than is necessary to protect public health 
and the environment. For some of the hazardous air pollu-
tants listed under subsection (b) it is possible to establish a 
"no observable effects level" (NOEL) below which human 
exposure is presumably "safe" ... To avoid expenditures by 
regulated entities which secure no public health or environ-
mental benefit, the Administrator is given discretionary 
authority to consider the evidence for a health threshold 
higher than MACT ... The Administrator is not required to 
take such factors into account; that would jeopardize the 
standard-setting schedule imposed under this section with 
the kind of lengthy study and debate that has crippled the 
current program. But where health thresholds are well-
established, for instance in the case of ammonia, and the 
pollutant presents no risk of other adverse health effects, 
including cancer, for which no threshold can be established, 
the Administrator may use the threshold with an ample 
margin of safety (and not considering cost) to set emissions 
limitations for sources in the category or sUbcategory. 
Employing a health threshold or safety level rather than the 
MACT criteria to set standards shall not result in adverse 
environmental effects which would otherwise be reduced or 
eliminated.106 
105 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing 1990 assumption that all 
carcinogens were non-threshold chemicals and only non-carcinogens generally possessed a 
"safe" threshold). 
106 S. REP. No. 228, at 171 (1989); 1 JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN, 
CLEAN AIR Acr: LAW AND PRACfICE § 11.12 (1991) (concluding that pursuant to subsec-
tion 112(d)(4), "[t]he 1990 amendments indicate that the EPA may sometimes establish 
routine emission standards more lenient than the levels that would otherwise be achieved 
by implementing MAcr."); Wichers et a!., supra note 30, at 10,722 ("The Senate Report 
suggests that the relevant MAcr performance standard could be relaxed if the HAP has a 
clearly defined threshold below which no adverse health effects are observed, and no 
adverse environmental effects are otherwise increased or prolonged.") (citing S. REP. No. 
228, supra, at 171). 
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For the purposes of this article, it is significant that subsection 
112( d)( 4) treats threshold non-carcinogens differently from non-
threshold carcinogens by providing a potential exemption from 
MACT for threshold chemicals, but not for non-threshold 
chemicals.107 
B. The EPA's Authority to Delist Under Subsection 112(c)(9)(B) 
1. Statutory Language 
In response to a petition by any person or the Administrator's 
own motion, subsection 112(c)(9)(B) authorizes the Administrator 
to delete a category or, sometimes, a subcategory of sources from 
the list of categories subject to MACT emission standards if all 
sources within the category or subcategory are below certain risk 
levels. lOB The EPA must approve or deny a petition under sub sec-
107 The EPA has used subsection 112(d)(4) to exempt some sources of low·risk, thresh· 
old chemicals. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218, 
55,218,55,227-28 (Sept. 13,2004) (to be codified at 40 c.F.R. Part 63) (providing alterna-
tive health-based standard to MACT technology-based standards for two low-risk, thresh-
old chemicals: (1) hydrogen chloride (HCl) and (2) manganese). 
108 Section 112(c)(9)(B) states in full: 
The Administrator may delete any source category from the list under this 
subsection, on petition of any person or on the Administrator's own motion, 
whenever the Administrator makes the following determination or determi-
nations, as applicable: 
(i) In the case of hazardous air pollutants emitted by sources in the category 
that may result in cancer in humans, a determination that no source in the 
category (or group of sources in the case of area sources) emits such hazard-
ous air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer 
greater than one-in-one-million to the individual in the population who is 
most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the source (or group of 
sources in the case of area sources). 
(ii) In the case of hazardous air pollutants that may result in adverse health 
effects in humans other than cancer or adverse environmental effects, a deter-
mination that emissions from no source in the category or subcategory con-
cerned (or group of sources in the case of area sources) exceed a level which 
is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no 
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any source (or 
from a group of sources in the case of area sources). 
The Administrator shall grant or deny a petition under this paragraph within 
1 year after the petition is filed. 
42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B); see PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,983 (explaining the differ-
ence between the EPA's deletion of categories or subcategories from MACT rules under 
subsection 112(c)(9) and Agency's authority to issue health-based standards providing an 
ample margin of safety pursuant to subsection 112(d)(4»; 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at 
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at 
10,247; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725. 
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tion 112(c)(9)(B) within one year of its filing. 109 In reconciling sub-
section 112(c)(9)(B) with subsection 112(d)'s MACT standards, 
Professor McGarity concludes that Congress adopted a "mixed 
strategy" that is primarily based on technology standards, but that 
also contains a "risk concession" for low-risk sources yo 
Subsection 112(c)(9)(B) explicitly employs different approaches 
for categories emitting carcinogens and categories releasing non-
carcinogens. For source categories that emit carcinogens, subsec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B)(i) states that the Administrator may delete a 
"category" if she "determin[es] that no source in the category (or 
group of sources in the case of area sources) emits such hazardous 
air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of can-
cer greater than one-in-one-million to the individual in the popula-
tion who is most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the 
source (or group of sources in the case of area sources)."111 Subsec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B)(i) does not mention the term, "subcategory."112 
Similarly, subsection 112(c)(9)(B) only explicitly refers to the dele-
tion of an entire source category and does not mention the deletion 
of subcategoriesY3 By contrast, subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) states 
that "[i]n the case of hazardous air pollutants that may result in 
adverse health effects in humans other than cancer or adverse envi-
ronmental effects," the Administrator may delete a "category or 
subcategory" of sources if she determines that "emissions from no 
source in the category or subcategory concerned (or group of 
109 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[3][c]; Wichers et aI., 
supra note 30, at 10,725. 
110 Professor McGarity's full explanation states: 
EPA may delete a category of sources of one or more hazardous pollutants 
from the list of categories, and thereby avoid the maximum achievable control 
. technology requirement for that category, if certain risk-based conditions are 
met for all sources in the category. In the case of threshold pollutants, EPA 
must find that emissions from no source in the category will exceed "a level 
which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and 
no adverse environmental effect will result." In the case of non threshold pol-
lutants, EPA must find that no source in the category emits hazardous pollu-
tants "in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than 
one-in-one-million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to 
emissions from the source." Thus, for such categories subject to deletion from 
the list, Congress has articulated a mixed strategy that is technology-based 
with a risk concession. 
McGarity, supra note 103, at 549 (citing subsection 112(c)(9)(B)) (footnotes omitted). 
111 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at 
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03 n.22; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at 
10,247; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725. 
112 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). 
113 42 U.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B). 
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sources in the case of area sources) exceed a level which is ade-
quate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and 
no adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from 
any source . . . . "114 Accordingly, subsection 112( c )(9)(B )(ii) 
explicitly authorizes the EPA to delist either a source category or 
subcategory of sources emitting non-carcinogens if the Agency 
concludes that (1) it can set an emission standard providing an 
ample margin of safety for human health from all sources in the 
category or subcategory and (2) no source in the category or sub-
category will pose an adverse effect on the environment if it is 
exempted from MACT standards. 
A crucial issue is whether subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) provides 
the EPA with the authority to delist both subcategories and catego-
ries of sources emitting carcinogens or only entire categories of 
sources. This question has important practical application because, 
for instance, the EPA claims that approximately one-half of PCWP 
sources are low-risk, but acknowledges that some pose a high risk 
of cancerYs Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and (ii) are similar in that 
both require that all the sources in a category (or a subcategory 
under Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii» that is being delis ted must meet 
the applicable risk threshold if the Administrator is to exempt that 
category or subcategoryY6 Accordingly, because all sources in 
either a subcategory or category must be "low-risk" in order for 
the EPA to delist that subcategory or category, the EPA can not 
de list the entire PCWP category because some PCWP sources are 
high-risk. Rather, the Agency can only delist a subcategory of 
"low-risk" PCWP sources if Subsection 112( c )(9)(B )(i) authorizes 
the EPA to delist a subcategory of carcinogenic sources. Parts V 
and VI will address whether the EPA may place the low-risk 
PCWP facilities in a separate subcategory and then delist them. 
114 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at 
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at 10,247; 
Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725. 
115 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,956. 
116 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,983 (explaining the difference between the 
EPA's deletion of categories or subcategories from MACT rules under subsection 
112(c)(9) and Agency's authority to issue health-based standards providing an ample mar-
gin of safety pursuant to subsection 112(d)(4». 
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V. THE PCWP RULE: THE EPA's USE OF SUBSECfION 
112(c)(9)(B) TO DELIST A SUBCATEGORY OF Low-RISK 
CARCINOGENIC SOURCES FROM 
MACT STANDARDS 
A. Summary of the PCWP Rule 
The PCWP rule applies to approximately 223 facilities that man-
ufacture plywood, veneer, particleboard, fiberboard or other com-
posite wood productsY7 According to the EPA's calculations, the 
PCWP rule will reduce emissions of several air toxics-acetalde-
hyde, acrolein, formaldehyde, methanol, phenol, propionaldehyde 
and others-by at least 6,600 tons and as much as 11,000 tons per 
year (approximately 35 to 58 percent lower than 1997 levels)Ys 
The EPA estimated that the total annual costs for the PCWP indus-
try to comply with the rule could be as high as $140 million per 
year, but the Agency suggested that the deletion of about 147 "low-
risk" PCWP sources from MACT would reduce the annual cost to 
about $74 millionY9 The total cost would vary in relationship to 
the number of facilities qualifying under the subsection 
112( c )(9)(B) deletion provisionpo 
It will be helpful to review the Rule's process for delisting facili-
ties. If an individual PCWP facility can demonstrate that it emits 
relatively low amounts of carcinogens, especially acrolein or for-
maldehyde, which are the most important carcinogens typically 
released by PCWP facilities, the EPA will use its alleged authority 
under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) to "delist" that facility from the 
PCWP category's MACT standards and place it instead in a sepa-
rate low-risk subcategory of PCWP sources that are not subject to 
MACT.121 Each PCWP source has the burden of demonstrating 
that it is low-risk.122 To qualify for the subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
exempt subcategory, each PCWP source must submit a risk assess-
ment showing that the source is low-risk as defined by the PCWP 
rule.123 A source can either use "look-up tables" in Appendix B of 
subpart DDDD of the rule, or use data from site-specific modeling 
to demonstrate that it is low-risk. The EPA stated: 




121 [d. at 45,953-56, 45,983-91, 45,995-96, 45,998-99, 46,040-45; see also 42 U.S.c. 
§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). 
122 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,953-56, 45,983-91, 45,995-96, 45,998-99, 46,040-45. 
123 [d. at 45,946, 45,953-54, 45,991-46,007, 46,040-43. 
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Today's final PCWP rule provides two ways that an affected 
source may demonstrate that it is part of the low-risk subcat-
egory of PCWP affected sources. First, look-up tables allow 
affected sources to determine, using a limited number of 
site-specific input parameters, whether emissions from their 
sources might cause a hazard index (HI) limit for noncarci-
nogens or a cancer benchmark of one in a million to be 
exceeded. Second, a site-specific modeling approach can be 
used by those affected sources that cannot demonstrate that 
they are part of the low-risk subcategory using the look-up 
tables.124 
The EPA has estimated that approximately 147 of the 223 PCWP 
sources in the PCWP MACT category may qualify for the subsec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B)(i) "low-risk" exceptionPS 
B. Public Comments on Delisting a Subcategory of Carcinogens 
One commenter on the proposed PCWP rule argued that the 
absence of the term "subcategories" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
implied that Congress intended to prohibit the Administrator from 
delisting subcategories of sources emitting carcinogens under sub-
section 112(c)(9)(B).126 That commenter contended that the dis-
tinction between threshold and non-threshold sources is consistent 
with 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s requirement of a higher standard of proof to 
delist categories that emit carcinogens.127 They also asserted that 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s requirement that no source in a cate-
gory pose greater than a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for 
the most exposed individual is "a higher and more specific stan-
dard" than the standard for deleting categories or subcategories of 
non-carcinogenic air toxics under subsection 112( c )(9)(B )(ii), 
which simply requires an "ample margin of safety. "128 
Other commenters, however, argued that the EPA should con-
strue the statute to allow it to delete categories or subcategories 
under either subsections 112(c)(9)(B)(i) or (ii).129 They noted that 
section 112(c)(1) generally gives the EPA broad authority in defin-
ing categories and subcategories of sources.130 One commenter 
argued that Congress had used the terms category and subcategory 
124 ld. at 45,984, 46,040-45. 
125 ld. at 45,956. 
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interchangeably throughout section 112, and therefore, that one 
should interpret subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) as authorizing the EPA 
to de list either a category and subcategory of sources.l3l 
C. The EPA's Argument That the Agency Has Broad Discretion 
to Define Categories or Subcategories Under Section 112 
1. The Agency's Broad Discretion Argument 
In the PCWP rule, the EPA argued that various provisions of 
section 112 gave it broad discretion to define which sources com-
prise a category or subcategory, and therefore, to classify sources 
as either a category or subcategoryY2 In particular, the EPA 
relied on two provisions of section 112 that give the agency broad 
discretionary authority: (1) subsection 112(d)(I), which authorizes 
the EPA to distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources 
within a category and (2) subsection 112(c)(I), which authorizes 
the Agency to revise, "when appropriate," but at least every eight 
years, its list of categories and subcategories of major sources and 
area sources. Subsection 112(c)(I), however, encourages the 
Agency "to the extent practicable" to make its section 112 list con-
sistent with its "list of source categories published pursuant to sec-
tion 111 of this Title."133 
Some commenters to the draft PCWP Rule argued that either 
subsection 112(c)(I) or 112(c)(9)(B) requires the EPA to base cate-
gories and subcategories on traditional criteria such as differences 
in output, products, processes or technology, and that risk is not an 
appropriate basis for distinguishing among categories or subcatego-
riesp4 In the final PCWP Rule, the EPA acknowledged that the 
Agency's past practice was to base subcategories and categories on 
engineering factors and not risk, stating: "We do not contend that 
the CAA specifically directs us to establish categories and subcat-
egories of HAP sources based on risk, and we recognize that, at the 
time of the 1990 CAA Amendments, Congress may have assumed 
that we would generally base categories and subcategories on the 
traditional technological, process, output, and product factors that 
had been considered under CAA section 111."135 The EPA 
argued, however, that it was not bound by subsections 112(c)(I) or 
112( c )(9) to use traditional categories and could base a subcategory 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 45,946, 45,984-85, 45,986-91. 
133 Id. at 45,984 (discussing 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(1), (d)(l». 
134 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,987-90. 
135 Id. at 45,989. 
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on risk-based factorsP6 Although subsection 112(c)(1) states that 
the EPA should try to make the section 112 list of source categories 
and subcategories consistent with the section 111 list, section 
112(c)(1) also concludes that this goal of making the two lists con-
sistent does not "limit[] the Administrator's authority to establish 
subcategories under this section, as appropriate."137 Accordingly, 
the EPA argued: 
Therefore, by its plain terms, section 112(c)(1) does not pre-
clude basing subcategories on criteria other than those tradi-
tionally used under section 111 before 1990, or those used 
after 1990 for sections 111 and 112. Moreover, while after 
1990 we have principally used the traditional criteria to 
define categories and subcategories, such use in general 
does not restrict how we may define a subcategory in a spe-
cific case, "as appropriate," since each HAP-emitting indus-
try presents its own unique situation and factors to be 
considered.138 
An important question is whether the EPA's discretion to define 
categories and subcategories under subsections 112(c)(1) and 
112(d)(1) applies as well to 112(c)(9)(B)(i), which refers only to 
the term "category," but does not mention the term "subcategory." 
In light of its broad discretion under section 112 to define which 
sources comprise a category or subcategory, the EPA argued that it 
has implied authority under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) to delist a 
subcategory of sources emitting carcinogens from MACT standards 
despite the absence of explicit language in that subsection provid-
ing such authorityY9 The Agency stated: 
Section 112( c )(9) of the CAA allows us to delete categories 
and subcategories from the list of HAP sources to be subject 
to MACf standards under section 112( d) of the CAA, if 
certain substantive criteria are met. (The EPA construes 
this authority to apply to listed subcategories because doing 
so is logical in the context of the general regulatory scheme 
established by the statute, and is reasonable since section 
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) expressly refers to subcategories.) To 
delete a category or subcategory the Administrator must 
make an initial demonstration that no source in the category 
or subcategory: (1) Emits carcinogens in amounts that may 
result in a lifetime cancer risk exceeding one in a million to 
136 Id. at 45,989-90. 
137 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(l). 
138 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,989 (internal citation omitted). 
139 See id. at 45,944, 45,946, 45,984-85, 45,986--91. 
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the individual most exposed; (2) emits noncarcinogens in 
amounts that exceed a level which is adequate to provide an 
ample margin of safety to protect public health; and (3) 
emits any HAP or combination of HAP in amounts that will 
result in an adverse environmental effect, as defined by sec-
tion 112(a)(7) of the CAA.14o 
2. Problems With the EPA's Claim of Broad Discretion Under 
Subsections 112 ( c)( 1) and 112 (d) (1) 
There are several problems with the EPA's interpretation that its 
discretion under subsections 112(c)(I) or 112(d)(I) to define cate-
gories or subcategories implies that it has similar discretion under 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i).141 In particular, subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s plain reference to the term "category" but omis-
sion of the term "subcategory" raises serious questions about the 
extent of the EPA's authority to delist a subcategory of carcino-
genic sources.142 Neither subsection 112(c)(I) nor 112(d)(I) pur-
ports to expand the EPA's authority under subsection 
112( c )(9)(B)(i).143 
Although subsection 112(d)(I)'s first clause authorizes the EPA 
to "distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a 
category or subcategory in establishing [emission] standards ... ," 
the statute's second clause plainly states that the provision does not 
authorize the EPA to take actions that cause delay in the compli-
ance date for any standard applicable to any source under subsec-
tion 112(i).144 Because the PCWP rule effectively delays the 
compliance date for all low-risk sources, the EPA's decision to 
de list a subcategory of PCWP "low-risk" sources arguably contra-
dicts the no-delay command of subsection 112(i).145 Furthermore, 
the first clause of subsection 112(d)(I) authorizes the EPA to "dis-
tinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a cate-
gory or subcategory in establishing [emission] standards ... ," but 
does not authorize the Agency to exempt individual sources from 
emission standards by placing them into an exempt category or 
subcategory.146 
140 [d. at 45,946. 
141 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 34-35. 
142 [d. 
143 See id. at 36. 
144 See id. at 35 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1)(i)). 
145 See id. at 35-36 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(i)). 
146 See id. at 37 n.83 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1)). 
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Moreover, by exempting "low-risk" sources, the PCWP Rule 
arguably violates the command in subsections 112( c )(2) and 
112(d)(1) that the Agency promulgate emission standards for all 
major sources of air toxics.147 Subsection 112(c)(2) states that, 
"[f]or the categories and subcategories the Administrator lists, the 
Administrator shall establish emissions standards under subsection 
(d) of this section, according to the schedule in this subsection and 
subsection (e) of this section."148 Similarly, subsection 112(d)(1) 
states that "[t]he Administrator shall promulgate regulations estab-
lishing emission standards for each category or subcategory of 
major sources and area sources of hazardous air pollutants listed 
for regulation pursuant to subsection (c) and (e) of this section. "149 
By indefinitely delaying the imposition of emission standards for 
"low-risk" sources, the PCWP rule arguably contravenes subsec-
tion 112(c)(2) and 112(d)(1)'s requirement that the EPA promul-
gate emission standards for all categories and subcategories of 
sources subject to MACT.150 Therefore, the EPA's authority to 
delist a subcategory or category from emission standards must 
come from subsection 112(c)(9)(B) and not from either subsection 
112(c)(2) or 112(d)(1). For example, if the EPA appropriately 
delists a category of sources, then it would not need to apply other-
wise applicable MACT standards to sources in the delisted cate-
gory or subcategory. 
3. Is the EPA's Low-Risk Subcategory the Equivalent of 
Exempting Individual Sources? 
The PCWP Rule's methodology of allowing the Agency to place 
individual sources into a low-risk subcategory if the individual 
sources demonstrate that they are "low-risk" is questionable 
because Congress in 1990 specifically rejected the EPA's request 
that it have the authority to exempt individual sources from MACT 
standards.151 During the Senate debate on the 1990 Amendments, 
Senator Durenberger stated that the congressional Conference 
Committee in charge of reconciling the House and Senate bills, of 
which Senator Durenberger was a member, specifically rejected a 
147 See id. at 36-37 (citing 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(2), (d)(l». 
148 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(2) (emphasis added); see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, 
supra note 22, at 36 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(2». 
149 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1) (emphasis added); see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, 
supra note 22, at 36-37 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1». 
150 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 36-37 (citing 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 7412(c)(2), (d)(l». 
151 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 36-57. 
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proposal in the House Bill to allow the EPA the authority to 
exempt individual sources.152 In the PCWP rule, the EPA acknowl-
edged Congress's refusal to give it authority to grant source-spe-
cific exemptions. The Agency rejected industry's request that the 
Agency use its subsection 112(d)(4) authority to create alternative 
emission standards for threshold pollutants, stating "[T]he legisla-
tive history of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA indicates that 
Congress considered and rejected allowing us to grant such source-
specific exemptions from the MACT flOOr."153 In light of Con-
gress's rejection of giving the EPA source-specific exemptions, the 
best interpretation of the EPA's delisting authority under subsec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B) is that the EPA may delist only an entire pre-
existing category or entire subcategory of sources provided that all 
sources in the relevant category or subcategory are low-risk. The 
Agency may not delist individual sources on a case-by-case basis. 
The EPA's approach in the PCWP Rule of exempting individual 
sources from a listed category based on their individual risk is 
inconsistent with Congress's intent that subsection 112(c)(9)(B) 
only allow the EPA to de list an entire pre-existing category or sub-
category. The selection of individual sources based on risk is 
equivalent in all essential respects to delisting individual sources on 
a case-by-case basis.154 • 
The Petition quotes a March 4, 2002 draft memorandum from 
the EPA's Office of General Counsel that concluded that Congress 
did not intend the EPA to have the authority to exempt individual 
sources from MACT requirements. 
The conclusion that Congress did not intend to exempt indi-
vidual low-risk sources is further supported by Congress's 
rejection of a provision that would have allowed relaxed 
standards for such individual low-risk sources. The House 
Bill, H.R. 3030, would have allowed a source to comply with 
an alternative emission limitation (in lieu of the technology-
based standards otherwise required), if the source could 
demonstrate that emissions meeting the alternative limita-
152 Senator Durenberger stated, "The fourth set of alternatives reviewed in the paper 
concern source-by-source exemptions from MACT based on risk assessments, a provision 
contained in the House bill. The authority for such exemptions was not present in the 
Senate bill, and the House receded to the Senate on this point. The provision was deleted 
in conference." See supra note 97, at S16,932 (remarks of Senator Durenberger); PCWP 
Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 37-38. 
153 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra 
note 22, at 38. 
154 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 37 (discussing individual 
source exemption in PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 46,012, 46,040). 
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tion would present a negligible risk to public health. Sena-
tor Durenberger explained that this source-specific risk-
based exemption was rejected by Congress. 155 
The Draft aGC Memorandum did not become public until the 
Los Angeles Times published it on May 21, 2004, more than two 
months after the public comment period closed for the PCWP Rule 
on March 10, 2004.156 Responding to questions about the Memo-
randum from Los Angeles Times reporters, Jeffrey R. Holmstead, 
an Assistant Administrator of the EPA who was then the highest-
ranking Agency official in charge of air issues, acknowledged the 
issue was debated by EPA lawyers, but stated, "[a]t the end of the 
day, the agency determined it was something we did have the 
authority to dO."157 The Memorandum was not adopted as an offi-
cial interpretation by the EPA, but it does raise troubling questions 
about whether the PCWP Rule violates congressional intent to 
deny the EPA the authority to exempt individual sources from 
MACT. 
The PCWP Rule tries to distinguish between Congress's denial 
of authority for the EPA to impose weaker standards than MACT 
for individual sources, at least under subsection 112( d)( 4 ),158 and 
the EPA's new policy of using risk to exempt individual "low-risk" 
sources as part of a "low-risk" subcategory" through the subsection 
112(c)(9)(B) delisting process. 
Our approach does not equate to one that Congress consid-
ered and rejected that would have allowed source-by-source 
exemptions from MACT based on individualized demon-
strations that such sources are low risk. This is because, con~ 
trary to that approach, we rely upon the application of 
specific eligibility criteria that are defined in advance of any 
source's application to be included in the low-risk PCWP 
subcategory, in much the same way as any other applicabil-
ity determination process works. Moreover, in response to 
the assertion that our approach nevertheless conflicts with 
155 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38 (quoting Draft Memoran-
dum, EPA Office of General Counsel, 10-11 (Mar. 4, 2002». 
156 Alan C. Miller & Tom Hamburger, EPA Relied on Industry for Plywood Plant Pollu-
tion Rule, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at Al (discussing EPA memorandum questioning 
authority of the EPA to exempt individual sources from MACT requirements); PCWP 
Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 39 n.85; PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 
45,946 (stating "[t]he public comment period lasted from January 9, 2003, to March 10, 
2003."). 
157 Miller & Hamburger, supra note 156, at Al. 
158 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra 
note 22, at 38. 
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legislative history rejecting a similar (but not identical) 
approach Congress considered under CAA section 112, this 
legislative history is not substantive legislative history dem-
onstrating that Congress voted against relief from MACT in 
this situation-there is no such history. The commenters 
point to a provision in the House bill that was not enacted 
but that would have provided in certain situations for case-
by-case exemptions for low-risk sources. There is no evi-
dence that this provision was ever debated, considered, or 
voted upon, so its not being enacted is not probative of con-
gressional intent concerning our ability to identify and delist 
a group of low-risk PCWP affected sources. Instead, it is 
reasonable to assume that, had Congress been aware in 1990 
of the possibility that an identifiable group of PCWP 
affected sources is low risk, while that group does not corre-
spond to traditional criteria differentiating categories and 
subcategories, Congress would have expressly, rather than 
implicitly, authorized our action here.159 
The Draft OGC Memorandum, however, specifically argues that 
Congress in 1990 would have rejected any source-by-source 
exemption based solely on risk and not on differences in technol-
ogy, equipment, or types of emissions. 
The statute and legislative history demonstrates that, for 
non-threshold pollutants, Congress did not intend to regu-
late only high-risk sources or to regulate sources only to the 
point where they meet the risk criteria of 112( c )(9) or 
112(f) . . .. [S]ubcategorization based on risk would effec-
tively allow source-specific delisting under 112( c )(9). Such 
an outcome is not contemplated by the language of section 
112(c)(9) and was expressly rejected by Congress in drafting 
section 112.160 
Despite the Agency's assertions in the PCWP Rule that its delist-
ing process is somehow different from the source-specific exemp-
tion proposal Congress rejected in 1990, the EPA's delisting 
process is virtually the same type of source-by-source exemption.161 
The PCWP Rule acknowledges that it uses a source-by-source 
exemption process to determine which sources fall into the low-risk 
159 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra 
note 22, at 39. 
160 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40 (quoting Draft Memoran-
dum, EPA Office of General Counsel, 10-11 (Mar. 4, 2002)) (emphasis added). 
161 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40. 
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subcategory.162 Additionally, the Rule concedes that risk is the 
sole basis for determining which sources to delist, and, therefore 
exempt from MACT standards.163 Because the EPA's PCWP Rule 
exempts individual low-risk PCWP sources and then places them 
into a low-risk subcategory, the approach is tantamount to the 
power of individual exemption that Congress refused to grant to 
the Agency in the 1990 Amendments.164 The EPA itself conceded 
in the PCWP Rule that "the legislative history of the 1990 Amend-
ments to the CAA indicates that Congress considered and rejected 
allowing us to grant such source-specific exemptions from the 
MACT floor. "165 The Supreme Court has considered whether 
Congress specifically rejected a proposal in determining the proper 
interpretation of a statute.166 Accordingly, the EPA's assertion 
that Congress in 1990 would have accepted its delisting approach 
even though it had rejected a very similar proposal for source-by-
source exemptions is not credible. Courts should reject the EPA's 
interpretation that it may evaluate individual sources and then 
place them into a low-risk category.167 Instead, the EPA should 
define categories or subcategories based on traditional technologi-
cal, process, output, and product factors, and then delist a category 
only if all sources in the category are low-risk. 
162 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 ("[T]he approach we are taking for identi-
fying additional low-risk PCWP affected sources is fully consistent with the approach we 
have long taken in identifying, on a case-by-case basis and subject to appropriate review, 
whether individual sources are members of a category or subcategory subject to standards 
adopted under CAA section 111 and 112."); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra 
note 22, at 40 n.87. 
163 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 ("[T]he criteria for the low-risk subcategory 
we are delisting are based solely on risk and not on technological differences in equipment 
or emissions."); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40-41. 
164 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38-41. 
165 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra 
note 22, at 41. 
166 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Servo V. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
441-443 (1987) (stating Court considered Congress's explicit rejection of provision in 
determining interpretation of statute); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, 
at 41-42. 
167 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n V. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (holding Agency rule arbitrary and capricious under Administrative Procedure Act 
where agency "offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the Agency"); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 42. 
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VI. Is SUBSECfION 112(c)(9)(B)(I)'S USE OF THE TERM 
"CATEGORY" BINDING OR A DRAFTING ERROR? 
A. The EPA's Drafting Error Argument 
The plain language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly pro-
vides the EPA with authority to exempt only whole categories of 
sources emitting cancer-causing chemicals, if none of the sources in 
the category pose greater than a one-in-one-million risk of cancer 
to the most exposed individual.168 In its PCWP Rule, however, the 
EPA argues that the omission of the term "subcategory" in subsec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B)(i) was "nothing more than a drafting error." The 
EPA in its PCWP Rule responded to a comment that it did not 
have authority under subsection 112(c)(9)(B) to delete a subcat-
egory of low-risk sources of carcinogens: 
Regarding the comment that Congress did not expressly 
provide relief for carcinogen-emitting low-risk groups of 
sources within the PCWP category other than as an entire 
category, we construe the provisions of CAA section 
112(c)(9) to apply to listed subcategories as well as to cate-
gories. This construction is logical in the context of the gen-
eral regulatory scheme established by the statute, and it is 
the most reasonable one because section 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) 
expressly refers to subcategories. Under a literal reading of 
section 112(c)(9)(B), no subcategory could ever be delisted, 
notwithstanding the explicit reference to subcategories, 
since the introductory language of section 112(c)(9)(B) pro-
vides explicit authority to only delist categories. Such a 
reading makes no sense, at the very least because Congress 
plainly assumed we might also delist another collection of 
sources besides either categories or subcategories, even in 
the case of sources of carcinogens. Both sections 
112( c )(9)(B)(i) and (ii) refer additionally to groups of 
sources in the case of area sources as being eligible for 
delisting, even though only a category of sources is specifi-
cally identified as eligible for delisting in the introductory 
language of section 112(c)(9)(B). In light of the broader 
congressional purpose behind the delisting authority, we 
interpret the absence of explicit references to subcategories 
in this introductory language and in section 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
as representing nothing more than a drafting error.169 
168 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). 
169 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990. 
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In other words, the EPA contends that the omission of the term 
"subcategory" is the result of an alleged scrivener's error.170 
B. Courts Narrowly Apply the Scrivener's Error Doctrine 
The federal courts have recognized an inherent judicial authority 
to correct obvious clerical mistakes in a statute, accepting the doc-
trine of scrivener's error. l71 However, the federal courts have also 
adopted a narrow approach to that corrective power to avoid 
usurping legislative authority. Courts use the doctrine where 
"there is only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake 
reflected a deliberate legislative compromise. "172 The Supreme 
Court has stated that when courts interpret a statute they "must 
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there."173 That said, the Court has 
recognized an exception to the general rule, stating: "[t]he plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare 
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. In 
such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict lan-
guage, controls."174 The Supreme Court will employ the scriv-
170 There are various definitions of the term "scrivener's error." See, e.g., United States 
Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (defining "scriv-
ener's error" as "a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law's object and 
design"); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAlTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 20 (1997) (defining "scrivener's error" as a situation where "on the very face of the 
statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative 
wisdom) has been made"); Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener's Error, 52 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 589, 593-94 (2000) (stating '''[s]crivener's error' refers to a typographical mistake or 
other error of a clerical nature in the drafting of a document," but discussing other defini-
tions of the term). 
171 See, e.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.36, at 277 (5th ed. 1992) ("A majority of cases permit the substitution of one word for 
another if necessary to carry out the legislative intent or express clearly manifested mean-
ing."); Fried, supra note 170, at 589, 594-99; John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1996) ("Almost all courts will correct a 'scrivener's error."'). 
172 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265 
(2003) (explaining scrivener's error doctrine); accord Fried, supra note 170, at 603-04 (stat-
ing "courts generally will correct a scrivener's error only if the literal meaning of the stat-
ute would otherwise be so bizarre as to be unreasonable. Indeed, the doctrine must be so 
restricted, for in most cases the absurdity of the statute as written is the primary evidence 
that a drafting mistake has occurred") (emphasis added). The varying approaches of state 
courts to the scrivener's error doctrine are beyond the scope of this article. See generally 
Fried, supra note 170, at 589-605 (discussing varying approaches of several different state 
supreme courts to the scrivener's error doctrine). 
173 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). 
174 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
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ener's error doctrine to correct otherwise plain statutory language 
only if there is "overwhelm[ing] evidence from the structure, lan-
guage, and subject matter" of the statute demonstrating that Con-
gress must have intended to use a different word than that in the 
statute.175 
Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the D.C. Circuit has 
emphasized that the scrivener's error doctrine is a narrow tool to 
be used by courts only where there are very strong reasons to re-
interpret a statute's normally controlling language to avoid an 
absurd result or a construction that is clearly contrary to the likely 
intent of Congress: 
Reading a statute contrary to its seemingly clear meaning is 
permissible "[i]f 'the literal application of a statute will pro-
duce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.'" We will not, however, invoke this rule to ratify 
an interpretation that abrogates the enacted statutory text 
absent an extraordinarily convincing justification: "The 
court's role is not to 'correct' the text so that it better serves 
the statute's purposes, for it is the function of the political 
branches not only to define the goals but also to choose the 
means for reaching them .... Therefore, for the EPA to 
avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, it must 
show either that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress did 
not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as a matter of 
logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have 
meant it.,,176 
In 2003, the D.C. Circuit stated that it will not invoke the scriv-
ener's error doctrine as long as there is a "plausible interpretation" 
175 See Nat'l Bank, 508 U.S. at 462. Even Justice Scalia who is a proponent of textualist 
statutory interpretation acknowledges the possibility of deviating from the text if there is 
strong evidence of a scrivener's error. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 
U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, 
to acknowledge a doctrine of 'scrivener's error' that permits a court to give an unusual 
(though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would 
produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding term "defendant" in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) refers only to criminal defendants and suggesting that 
drafters had inadvertently left out qualification "criminal" defendant); SCALIA, supra note 
170, at 20 (1997) (recognizing exception from textualism for '''scrivener's error"'); Brad-
ford Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 829 n.77 (2002) (discussing Justice Scalia's use of "'scrivener's error" 
doctrine); Manning, supra note 172, at 2459 n.265; John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity a/the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 116-17 (2001). 
176 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
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to the literal statutory language. I77 In Appalachian Power Co. v. 
EPA,178 the D.C. Circuit found a scrivener's error where an inter-
nal cross-reference in the Act to § 110(a)(2)(D)(ii) only made 
sense if the reference was to § 110(a)(2)(D)(i).179 The Appalachian 
Power decision limited the doctrine to cases providing an "extraor-
dinarily convincing justification. "180 
C. Refuting the EPA's Drafting Error Argument 
As will be demonstrated below, the EPA fails to meet its heavy 
burden of demonstrating that the omission of the term "subcat-
egory" from subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a scrivener's error. That 
is because there are plausible reasons why Congress may haven 
chosen to allow the EPA to delist subcategories of less harmful 
non-carcinogens, but not to de list subcategories of carcinogens. 
1. Logic is Not Enough 
The EPA's response consists of four somewhat overlapping argu-
ments to support its drafting error conclusion. However, none of 
them are sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that courts 
should follow a statute's plain language.181 First, the EPA contends 
that "This construction is logical in the context of the general regu-
latory scheme established by the statute .... "182 It is not enough, 
however, that there is an alternative logical construction of a stat-
ute. A court may disregard the plain language of a statute only if 
there are strong reasons to do so, including instances where the 
plain language is clearly illogical or appears to contradict Con-
gress's almost certain intent.183 
2. The Most Reasonable Construction Does Not Prove a 
Drafting Error 
Second, the EPA contends that its interpretation that Congress 
inadvertently omitted the term "subcategories" in subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i) "is the most reasonable [construction] because sec-
tion 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) expressly refers to subcategories."184 Even if 
177 Williams Cos. v. F.E.R.C., 345 F.3d 910, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
178 Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1032. 
179 [d. at 1041. 
ISO [d. 
181 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 46-49. 
182 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990. 
183 See Nat'l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 462; Williams Cos., 345 F.3d at 912; Appalachian 
Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 45-46. 
184 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990. 
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the EPA is correct that its interpretation is the most reasonable 
construction, the Agency's drafting error argument still fails if 
there are other plausible interpretations that would explain Con-
gress's omission of the term "subcategory" in 112(c)(9)(B)(i).185 In 
light of Congress's often different treatment of carcinogens and 
non-carcinogens in subsection 112, including Congress's decision to 
use the ample margin of safety standard for non-carcinogens in 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) and the one-in-one-million standard for 
carcinogens in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i), there is a plausible argu-
ment that Congress understood the distinction between categories 
and subcategories and consciously omitted the term subcategories 
in the latter subsection because carcinogens are more dangerous.186 
Similarly, subsection 112(c)(9)(A) permits delisting only for a 
"source category."187 Additionally, the EPA's second argument 
does not address the possibility that Congress committed a drafting 
error by including the term "subcategory" in subsection 
112( c )(9)(B)(ii).188 
3. A Literal Reading of Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is Reasonable 
and Does Not Contradict Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) 
Third, the EPA argues that "[u]nder a literal reading of section 
112(c)(9)(B), no subcategory could ever be delisted, notwithstand-
ing the explicit reference to subcategories, since the introductory 
language of section 112(c)(9)(B) provides explicit authority to only 
delist categories."189 The EPA does not explain why such an inter-
pretation is absurd or implausible which is the standatd used by 
federal courts in deciding whether the scrivener's error doctrine 
applies.190 It is possible that Congress did not wish the EPA to 
have the discretion to exempt some subcategories of carcinogenic 
sources through a delisting process while subjecting other carcino-
genic sources in the source category to MACT rules.191 It is at least 
plausible that Congress intended to authorize the EPA to delist 
185 Williams Cos., 345 F.3d at 912 (stating that court would not find scrivener's error if 
there is a plausible interpretation of the statute's plain language); PCWP Petition for 
Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 44-51 (arguing the EPA's claim that absence of the term 
"subcategory" in 42 U.S.c. § 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a drafting error is wrong because there are 
plausible reasons why Congress chose to omit that term). 
186 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47. 
187 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(A). 
188 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47. 
189 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990. 
190 Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1041. 
191 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47. 
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carcinogenic sources only if every carcinogenic source in an entire 
category posed low-risk; an all-or-nothing approach.l92 
The EPA's claim that there is an internal contradiction between 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii)'s reference to both "categories" and 
"subcategories" and subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s reference to only 
"categories" does not demonstrate a similar contradiction between 
subsections 112( c )(9)(B)(ii) and 112( c )(9)(B)(i)'s different treat-
ment of carcinogens and non-carcinogens.193 One commenter 
argued that "the absence of the term 'subcategories' in section 
112(c)(9)(B)(i) indicates a Congressional choice not to permit the 
Administrator to delist subcategories of sources under subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)."194 That commenter also stated that the omission of 
the term "subcategory" in 112(c)(9)(B)(i) "is consistent with Con-
gress'[ s] decision to require a higher standard to delist categories 
that emit carcinogens."195 According to that commenter, the sub-
section 112( c )(9)(B )(ii) requirement of less than one-in-one-mil-
lion lifetime cancer risk for the most exposed individual "is a 
higher and more specific standard than the standard for other 
HAP[s],"196 Similarly, subsection 112(d)(4) provides the EPA with 
the authority to promulgate alternative emission standards for 
threshold pollutants, usually understood as only non-carcinogens in 
1990, as long as the alternative standard provides an ample margin 
of safety.197 However, subsection 112(d)(4) does not allow alterna-
tives for non-threshold carcinogens, which in 1990 most scientists 
believed included all carcinogens.198 Accordingly, because Con-
gress in several portions of section 112 treated carcinogens and 
non-carcinogens differently, it is plausible that Congress intended 
subsection 112( c )(9)(B)(i), unlike subsection 112( c )(9)(B)(ii), to 
prohibit the Agency from delisting subcategories of carcinogens 
even if the Agency may de list subcategories of non-carcinogens. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,987. 
195 [d. 
196 [d. 
197 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(4). 
198 [d. 
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4. Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s Approach for Delisting "Area 
Sources" Does Not Prove that the Omission of the Term 
"Subcategory" in Subsection 112 (c)(9) (B)(i) is 
Absurd 
Fourth and finally, the EPA argues that a "literal" reading of 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B) is absurd because Congress allowed the 
Agency to delist either categories or subcategories of area sources, 
even in the case of carcinogens, but did not do so under subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i) for major sources of carcinogens.199 Both subsec-
tions 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and (ii) refer to the Agency's authority to 
delist "groups of sources in the case of area sources," even though 
only a category of sources is specifically identified as eligible for 
delisting in the introductory language of section 112(c)(9)(B).200 
Although Congress could have done a better job in drafting the 
introductory language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B) by including a 
reference to area sources, the clear statutory language in subsec-
tions 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) that provides the EPA 
with the authority to delist a "group of sources in the case of area 
sources" is not absurd, but simply treats area sources differently 
from major sources.201 There are plausible reasons why Congress 
might provide the Agency with more discretion to delist small area 
sources that are generally less dangerous than "major" sources of 
air toxics. Congress exempted area sources from residual risk 
requirements202 and also allowed the EPA to apply less stringent, 
alternative GACT technology-based requirements or management 
practices for area sources.203 The statute's distinction between area 
and major sources is plausible and does not prove that Congress 
made a drafting error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) by omitting the 
term "subcategory. "204 
5. The EPA's Drafting Error Argument Fails 
The EPA's four interrelated arguments do not meet its burden of 
demonstrating "overwhelming evidence from the structure, lan-
guage, and subject matter of" section 112 necessary to prove that 
Congress made a scrivener's error not just once, but twice, in sub-
199 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990. 
200 See id. 
201 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 48. 
202 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(5). 
203 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(5) (providing EPA Administrator with discretion to use 
alternative GACf or management practices for area sources). 
204 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 48. 
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sections 112(c)(9)(B) and 112(c)(9)(B)(i).205 Congress used only 
the term "category" in both subsections.206 It is unlikely that Con-
gress made the same mistake twice.207 The EPA presents no evi-
dence from the Act's legislative history to demonstrate a drafting 
error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i),z08 On the contrary, the limited 
legislative history addressing subsection 112( c )(9)(B )(i) refers only 
to categories and not to subcategories.209 
There are plausible reasons why Congress may have intention-
ally omitted the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
even though the same term is included in subsection 
112( c )(9)(B)(ii) for non-carcinogens,zlo Subsection 112( c )(9)(B)(i) 
requires "a higher and more specific standard" of proof to delist 
categories that emit carcinogens (a one-in-one-million lifetime can-
cer risk for the most exposed individual) than subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) requires for deleting categories or subcategories of 
threshold air toxics (an "ample margin of safety standard)."211 
Congress may have been concerned about the difficult judgment 
calls the EPA would have to make in delisting some subcategories 
of carcinogenic sources, but not others.212 If every source in a cate-
gory emitting carcinogens has a risk less than one-in-one-million to 
the most exposed individual, then the source category as a whole is 
low-risk and delisting is appropriate.213 Accordingly, Congress 
may have deliberately excluded subcategories of sources emitting 
carcinogens under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i).214 
In light of section 112's frequent distinction between carcinogens 
and non-carcinogens, the EPA fails to prove that "the literal appli-
205 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 
1041 ("[F]or the EPA to avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, it must show 
either that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have 
said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have 
meant it.") (internal citation omitted); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, 
at 49-50. 
206 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 
1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50. 
207 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 
1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50. 
208 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49. 
209 136 CONGo REc. S2030, S2109 ("MACf standards are not required for source catego-
ries that pose less than a 1-in-1,000,OOO risk of cancer."); PCWP Petition for Reconsidera-
tion, supra note 22, at 49. 
210 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50. 
211 [d. 
212 See id. at 49-50. 
213 See id. at 50-51. 
214 See id. at 48. 
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cation of [the Act] will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters."215 Additionally, Congress's use of 
the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) demon-
strates that Congress knew how to explicitly employ that term if it 
wanted it to be included.216 Accordingly, a judge would likely con-
clude that subsection 112( c )(9)(B )(i) does not authorize the EPA 
to delist a subcategory of carcinogenic sources, but only an entire 
category and only if every source in that larger source category 
poses a lifetime risk of cancer to the most exposed individual of 
less than one-in-one-million.217 
D. Does the EPA's Interpretation of Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
Deserve Deference under Chevron? 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that, if a statute is silent or ambigu-
ous about the particular issue in question, courts should defer to an 
agency's reasonable interpretation of that statute if it is issued as 
part of a valid rule, because it is presumed that Congress delegated 
interpretive power to an agency with the authority to issue rules 
having the "force of law."218 If the language of a statute is clear, 
however, a court will not defer to the agency's interpretation of a 
statute, but will instead interpret and follow the plain language of 
the statute.219 If a statute's language is clear, a court will ignore the 
statute's plain language and instead follow an agency's contrary 
interpretation only if the agency can "show either that, as a matter 
215 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50. 
216 Id. at 47-50. 
217 Id. at 49-50. 
218 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 865-66 (1984) (stating courts should defer to Agency's inter-
pretation of ambiguous statutory language if interpretation is reasonable and stressing that 
executive agencies have more appropriate role in defining ambiguous statutory language 
because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts, and agencies are politically 
accountable through elections, unlike courts); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 215, 226-31 (2001) (explaining that Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to 
Agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statute or fill "gap" in a silent statute 
where Congress has delegated to Agency authority to issue regulations carrying "force of 
law"); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpre-
tations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 (1996) (describing presumption 
established in Chevron that silence in statute shows intent of Congress to leave act of inter-
pretation in hands of Agency in charge of administering act); Thomas w. Merrill & Kristin 
E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 passim (2001) (explaining that Chevron 
fundamentally expanded deference of courts to Agency interpretations of statutes by 
presuming gaps or ambiguities in statute as reflecting implicit congressional intent to dele-
gate interpretive authority to Agency). 
219 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If a statute's language is clear and specific, a court 
must reject an agency interpretation that is contrary to that language.") 
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of historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have 
said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost 
surely could not have meant it. "220 Even if a court finds that a 
statute contains a scrivener's error, the court does not defer to the 
agency's interpretation of the statute, but instead allows the agency 
to "'deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect 
congressional intent.' "221 
A court must follow a statute's plain language and not defer to 
an agency's contrary interpretation unless an agency can present 
strong evidence that the plain language is likely a drafting error. 
The EPA in the PCWP Rule fails to present any convincing evi-
dence or "historical fact[ s ]" demonstrating that Congress made a 
drafting error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) when it included only 
the term "category," but not the term "subcategory." Because 
there are plausible reasons why Congress might have treated delist-
ing differently for carcinogens and non-carcinogens, a court should 
not find that Congress made a scrivener's error. In the absence of 
convincing evidence that Congress made a scrivener's error, a 
court must follow the plain language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) 
and limit the Agency's delisting authority to entire categories of 
carcinogenic sources.222 Because the statute is clear and there is no 
clear evidence of a drafting error, a court should not give Chevron 
deference to the EPA's flawed interpretation in the PCWP Rule 
that subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) contains a drafting error and should 
include the term "subcategory."223 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The EPA's claim that it has the authority to exempt subcatego-
ries of so-called "low-risk" carcinogenic sources is significant 
because it could expand the PCWP MACT rule to many other 
industrial MACT categories or subcategories and exempt poten-
220 Appalachian Power Co, 249 F.3d at 1041; see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, 
supra note 22, at 44-46, 49-50. 
221 See Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1043-44 ("We do not give an agency alleging 
a scrivener's error the benefit of Chevron step two deference, by which the court credits 
any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. Rather, the agency may deviate no 
further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional intent." (citing Mova 
Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060,1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); PCWP Petition for Recon-
sideration, supra note 22, at 44-45; see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 
U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating courts should not "stretch" the doctrine of 
scrivener's error "so as to give [a] problematic text a meaning it cannot possibly bear"). 
222 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If a statute's language is clear and specific, a court 
must reject an agency interpretation that is contrary to that language."). 
223 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 45-46, 49-50. 
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tially thousands of sources governed by MACT standards in dozens 
of industries. In the PCWP Rule alone, the EPA is seeking to 
exempt over one-half of the sources in the PCWP industry-147 
sources.z24 If courts accept the EPA's scrivener's error argument 
that Congress inadvertently omitted the term' "subcategory" from 
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) then the EPA will have the effective 
power to exempt individual sources from MACT on a case-by-case 
basis. This is a power which Congress explicitly refused to give to 
the EPA in the 1990 Amendments.225 
In January 2005, Republican Senators James Inhofe (OK) and 
George Voinovich (OH) inserted language in their proposed 
"Clear Skies" legislation, Senate Bill 131, which primarily seeks to 
approve President Bush's controversial three-pollutant plan for the 
trading of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, and mercury, to explic-
itly approve the PCWP rule as well as three other low-risk exemp-
tions from MACT.226 At the Senate Environment Committee 
hearing on the bill, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) criti-
cized the MACT exemption provision for potentially allowing 
sources to release thousands of tons of carcinogens into the air.227 
To increase the bill's chances of passage, in February 2005, Sena-
tors Inhofe, Voinovich, and Christopher Bond (R-MO) amended 
the bill to eliminate the PCWP exemption provision before the 
224 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
225 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38-56 (arguing that Con-
gress in 1990 explicitly refused to grant to the EPA the authority to exempt individual 
sources from MACf standards, but that the EPA's low-risk exemption program in PCWP 
Rule effectively gave the Agency an equivalent power). 
226 S. 131, 109th Congo § 407(j)(I)(A)(ii) (Jan. 24, 2005) (creating exemption from 
MACf for sources covered by plywood rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,943); Darren Samuelsohn, Air 
Pollution; Voinovich sets deadline for dropping Clear Skies debate, Env't & Energy Daily, 
Jan. 27, 2005, available at 2005 WL 62125687 ("John Walke, a senior attorney at the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, said the 'opt-in' language added by Inhofe and Voinovich 
would allow four major industries to be exempt from existing U.S. EPA toxic air pollution 
control technology requirements, some of which are currently being litigated by environ-
mental groups who claim the agency rules are not stringent enough. Industrial, commercial 
and institutional boilers and process heaters, plywood and composite wood panel manufac-
turers, reciprocating internal combustion engines and stationary combustion turbines are 
all given specific regulatory relief in the GOP's new version of Clear Skies."). 
227 Clear Skies Act of 2005: Hearings on S. 131 Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works, 109th Congo (Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 131] 
(quoting remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton: "Section 407(j) of S. 131 includes a 
provision that carves out exemptions from current Clean Air Act requirements for four 
entire source categories, more than 70,000 units. This removes these units from Clean Air 
Act regulations for hazardous air pollutants, including carcinogens like benzene, probable 
carcinogens like formaldehyde ... "); Senate Republicans Drop Air Toxics Waiver in Clear 
Skies Bill, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 15, 2005. 
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Committee's February 16, 2005 markup of the bilp28 Accordingly, 
the D.C. Circuit will hear the case challenging the PCWP rule 
unless the EPA grants the petition for reconsideration. On July 29, 
2005, in response to the petition, the EPA published a Notice of 
Reconsideration with a forty-five day public comment period, end-
ing September 12, 2005.229 As this article went to publication, the 
EPA had not yet published its final rule and notice of final action 
regarding the Notice of Reconsideration, and the D.C. Circuit had 
not yet decided the case. 
Courts should reject the EPA's scrivener's error argument that 
Congress inadvertently omitted the term "subcategory" from sub-
section 112(c)(9)(B)(i). The EPA has failed to meet its heavy bur-
den of proving that Congress must have made a scrivener's error in 
omitting the term "subcategory" from subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). 
Based on Section 112's history, language and structure, there are 
plausible reasons why Congress may have allowed the deletion of 
subcategories of non-carcinogens, but refused to do the same for 
carcinogens, which Congress in the 1990 Amendments assumed 
had no threshold. The plain language of subsection 
112(c)(9)(B)(i), which allows the EPA to de list an entire "cate-
gory" of sources emitting carcinogens only if every source in that 
category poses a lifetime risk of cancer of less than one-in-one-
million, is reasonable.230 Accordingly, the EPA may not exempt 
subcategories of sources releasing carcinogens under 
112(c)(9)(B)(i). The PCWP Rule is invalid to the extent that the 
Agency authorized the delisting of a subcategory of low-risk carci-
nogenic sources. 
228 The amendment also eliminated MACT exemptions for two other industrial catego-
ries: (1) reciprocating internal combustion engines; and (2) stationary combustion turbines. 
See Hearings on S. 131, supra note 227. 
229 The Notice of Reconsideration summarized the eight arguments that the Petition had 
made challenging the risk-based portion of the final rule, including the following: (1) Risk 
assessment methodology; (2) background pollution and co-located emission sources; (3) 
the dose-response value used for formaldehyde; (4) costs and benefits of establishing a 
low-risk subcategory; (5) ecological risk; (6) legal basis for the risk-based approach; (7) 
MACT compliance date for affected sources previously qualifying for the low-risk subcat-
egory; and (8) title V implementation mechanism for the risk-based approach. EPA, 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood 
Products; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Cate-
gory List; Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,826, 43,826-29 (July 29, 2005). The petition 
also raised concerns regarding the final rule's start-up, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM) 
provisions that are beyond the scope of this Article. /d. at 43828-30. 
230 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-51. 
